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Abstract
We consider network contribution games, where each agent in a network has a budget of
effort that he can contribute to different collaborative projects or relationships. Depending
on the contribution of the involved agents a relationship will flourish or drown, and to
measure the success we use a reward function for each relationship. Every agent is trying
to maximize the reward from all relationships that it is involved in. We consider pairwise
equilibria of this game, and characterize the existence, computational complexity, and quality
of equilibrium based on the types of reward functions involved. When all reward functions
are concave, we prove that the price of anarchy is at most 2. For convex functions the same
only holds under some special but very natural conditions. Another special case extensively
treated are minimum effort games, where the reward of a relationship depends only on the
minimum effort of any of the participants. In these games, we can show existence of pairwise
equilibrium and a price of anarchy of 2 for concave functions and special classes of games with
convex functions. Finally, we show tight bounds for approximate equilibria and convergence
of dynamics in these games.
1 Introduction
Understanding the degree to which rational agents will participate in and contribute to joint
projects is critical in many areas of society. With the advent of the Internet and the consideration
of rationality in the design of multi-agent and peer-to-peer systems, these aspects are becoming
of interest to computer scientists and subject to analytical computer science research. Not
surprisingly, the study of contribution incentives has been an area of vital research interest in
economics and related areas with seminal contributions to the topic over the last decades. A
prominent example from experimental economics is the minimum effort coordination game [39],
in which a number of participants contribute to a joint project, and the outcome depends solely
on the minimum contribution of any agent. While the Nash equilibria in this game exhibit a
quite simple structure, behavior in laboratory experiments led to sometimes surprising patterns
see, e.g., [13,17,24,26,38] for recent examples. On the analytical side this game was studied, for
instance, with respect to logit-response dynamics and stochastic potential in [5].
In this paper we propose and study a simple framework of network contribution games for
contribution, collaboration, and coordination of actors embedded in networks. The game con-
tains the minimum effort coordination game as a special case and is closely related to many
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Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2010).
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other games from the economics literature. In such a game each player is a vertex in a graph,
and the edges represent bilateral relationships that he can engage in. Each player has a budget
of effort that he can contribute to different edges. Budgets and contributions are non-negative
numbers, and we use them as an abstraction for the different ways and degrees by which actors
can contribute to a relationship, e.g., by allocating time, money, and personal energy to main-
taining a friendship or a collaboration. Depending on the contribution of the involved actors
a relationship will flourish or drown, and to measure the success we use a reward function for
each relationship. Finally, each player strives to maximize the total success of all relationships
he is involved in.
A major issue that we address in our games is the impact of collaboration. An incentive
for collaboration evolves naturally when agents are embedded in (social) networks and engage
in relationships. We are interested in the way that a limited collaboration between agents
influences properties of equilibria in contribution games like existence, computational complexity,
the convergence of natural dynamics, as well as measures of inefficiency. In particular, in addition
to unilateral strategy changes we will allow pairs of players to change their strategies in a
coordinated manner. States that are resilient against such bilateral deviations are termed 2-
strong [4] or pairwise equilibria [31]. This adjustment raises a number of interesting questions.
What is the structure of pairwise equilibria, and what are conditions under which they exist? Can
we compute pairwise equilibria efficiently or at least efficiently decide their existence? Are there
natural improvement dynamics that allow players to reach a pairwise equilibrium (quickly)?
What are the prices of anarchy and stability, i.e., the ratios of the social welfare of the best
possible state over the worst and best welfare of an equilibrium, respectively? These are the
main questions that motivate our study. Before describing our results, we proceed with a formal
introduction of the model.
1.1 Network Contribution Games
We consider network contribution games as models for the contribution to relationships in net-
worked environments. In our games we are given a simple and undirected graph G = (V,E)
with n nodes and m edges. Every node v ∈ V is a player, and every edge e ∈ E represents a
relationship (collaboration, friendship, etc.). A player v has a given budget Bv ≥ 0 of the total
amount of effort that it is able to apply to all of its relationships (i.e., edges incident to v).
Budgets are called uniform if Bu = Bv for any u, v ∈ V . In this case, unless stated otherwise,
we assume that Bv = 1 for all v ∈ V and scale reward functions accordingly.
We denote by Ev the set of edges incident to v. A strategy for player v is a function
sv : Ev → R≥0 that satisfies
∑
e=(v,u) sv(e) ≤ Bv and specifies the amount of effort sv(e) that v
puts into relationship e ∈ Ev. A state of the game is simply a vector s = (s1, . . . , sn). The success
of a relationship e is measured by a reward function fe : R
2
≥0 → R, for which fe(x, y) ≥ 0 and
non-decreasing in x, y ≥ 0. The utility or welfare of a player v is simply the total success of all
its relationships, i.e., wv(s) =
∑
e=(v,u) fe(sv(e), su(e)), so both endpoints benefit equally from
the undirected edge e. In addition, we will assume that reward functions fe are symmetric, so
fe(x, y) = fe(y, x) for all x, y ≥ 0, and for ease of presentation we will assume they are continuous
and differentiable, although most of our results can be obtained without these assumptions.
We are interested in the existence and computational complexity of stable states, their
performance in terms of social welfare, and the convergence of natural dynamics to equilibrium.
The central concept of stability in strategic games is the (pure) Nash equilibrium, which is
resilient against unilateral deviations, i.e., a state s such that wv(sv, s−v) ≥ wv(s′v, s−v) for
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each v ∈ V and all possible strategies s′v. For the social welfare w(s) of a state s we use the
natural utilitarian approach and define w(s) =
∑
v∈V wv(s). A social optimum s
∗ is a state with
w(s∗) ≥ w(s) for every possible state s of the game. Note that we restrict attention to states
without randomization and consider only pure Nash equilibria. In particular, the term “Nash
equilibrium” will only refer to the pure variant throughout the paper.
In games such as ours, it makes sense to consider multilateral deviations, as well as unilateral
ones. Nash equilibria have shortcomings in this context, for instance for a pair of adjacent
nodes who would – although being unilaterally unable to increase their utility – benefit from
cooperating and increasing the effort jointly. The prediction of Nash equilibrium that such a
state is stable is quite unreasonable. In fact, it is easy to show that when considering pure Nash
equilibria, the function Φ(s) = w(s)/2 is an exact potential function for our games. This means
that s∗ is an optimal Nash equilibrium, the price of stability for Nash equilibria is always 1, and
iterative better response dynamics converge to an equilibrium. Additionally, for many natural
reward functions fe, the price of anarchy for Nash equilibria remains unbounded.
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Following the reasoning in, for example, [30,31], we instead consider pairwise equilibrium, and
focus on the more interesting case of bilateral deviations. An improving bilateral deviation in a
state s is a pair of strategies (s′u, s
′
v) such that wv(s
′
u, s
′
v, s−u,v) > wv(s) and wu(s
′
u, s
′
v, s−u,v) >
wu(s). A state s is a pairwise equilibrium if it is a Nash equilibrium and additionally there
are no improving bilateral deviations. Notice that we are actually using a stronger notion of
pairwise stability than described in [30], since any pair of players can change their strategies in
an arbitrary manner, instead of changing their contributions on just a single edge. In particular,
in a state s a coalition C ⊆ V has a coalitional deviation s′C if the reward of every player in C is
strictly greater when all players in C switch from strategies sC to s
′
C . s is a strong equilibrium if
no coalition C ⊆ V has a coalitional deviation. Our notion of pairwise equilibrium is exactly the
notion of 2-strong equilibrium [4], the restriction of strong equilibrium to deviations of coalitions
of size at most 2.
We evaluate the performance of stable states using prices of anarchy and stability, respec-
tively. The price of anarchy (stability) for pairwise equilibria in a game is the worst-case ratio
of w(s∗)/w(s) for the worst (best) pairwise equilibrium s in this game. For a class of games
(e.g., with certain convex reward functions) that have pairwise equilibria, the price of anarchy
(stability) for pairwise equilibria is simply the worst price of anarchy (stability) for pairwise
equilibria of any game in the class. If we consider classes of games, in which existence is not
guaranteed, the prices are defined as the worst prices of any game in the class that has pairwise
equilibria. Note that unless stated otherwise, the terms price of anarchy and stability refer to
pairwise equilibria throughout the paper.
1.2 Results and Contribution
We already observed above that in every game there always exist pure Nash equilibria. In
addition, iterative better response dynamics converge to a pure Nash equilibrium, and the price
of stability for Nash equilibria is 1. The price of anarchy for Nash equilibria, however, can be
arbitrarily large, even for very simple reward functions.
If we allow bilateral deviations, the conditions become much more interesting. Consider
the effort sv(e) expended by player v on an edge e = (u, v). The fact that fe is monotonic
nondecreasing tells us that wv increases in sv(e). Depending on the application being considered,
1Consider, for instance, a path of length 3 with (e1, e2, e3) and fe1(x, y) = fe3(x, y) = min(x, y) and fe2(x, y) =
M ·min(x, y), for some large number M .
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however, the utility could possess the property of “diminishing returns”, or on the contrary, could
increase at a faster rate as v puts more effort on e. In other words, for a fixed effort amount
su(e), fe as a function of sv(e) could be a concave or a convex function, and we will distinguish
the treatment of the framework based on these properties.
Existence Price of Anarchy
General convex Yes (*) 2
General concave Not always 2
ce · (x+ y) Decision in P 1
Minimum effort convex Yes (**) 2 (**)
Minimum effort concave Yes 2
Maximum effort Yes 2
Approximate Equilibrium OPT is a 2-apx. Equilibrium
Table 1: Summary of some of our results for various types of reward functions. For the cases
where equilibrium always exists, we also give algorithms to compute it, as well as convergence
results. All of our PoA upper bounds are tight. (*) If ∀e, fe(x, 0) = 0, NP-hard otherwise. (**)
If budgets are uniform, NP-hard otherwise.
In Section 2 we consider the case of convex reward functions. For a large class C of convex
functions defined below (Definition 2.2) we can show a tight bound for the price of anarchy
of 2 (Theorem 2.9). However, for games with functions from C pairwise equilibria might not
exist. In fact, we show that it is NP-hard to decide their existence, even when the edges have
simple reward functions of either the form fe(x, y) = ce · (xy) or fe(x, y) = ce · (x + y) for
constants ce > 0 (Theorem 2.7). If, however, all functions are of the form fe(x, y) = ce · (xy),
then existence and efficient computation are guaranteed. We show this existence result for a
substantially larger class of functions that may not even be convex, although it includes the
class of all convex functions fe with fe(x, 0) = 0 (Theorem 2.5). Our procedure to construct
a pairwise equilibrium in this case actually results in a strong equilibrium, i.e., the derived
states are resilient to deviations of every possible subset of players. As the prices of anarchy
and stability for pairwise equilibria are exactly 2, they extend to strong equilibria simply by
restriction.
As an interesting special case, we prove that if all functions are fe(x, y) = ce · (x + y), it is
possible to determine efficiently if pairwise equilibria exist and to compute them in polynomial
time in the cases they exist (Theorem 2.8).
In Section 3 we consider pairwise equilibria for concave reward functions. In this case,
pairwise equilibria may also not exist. Nevertheless, in the cases when they exist, we can show
tight bounds of 2 on prices of anarchy and stability (Theorem 3.1).
Sections 4 and 5 treat different special cases of particular interest. In Section 4 we study
the important case of minimum effort games with reward functions fe(x, y) = he(min(x, y)). If
functions he are convex, pairwise equilibria do not necessarily exist, and it is NP-hard to decide
the existence for a given game (Theorem 4.5). Perhaps surprisingly, if budgets are uniform, i.e., if
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Bv = Bu for all u, v ∈ V , then pairwise equilibria exist for all convex functions he (Theorem 4.2),
and the prices of anarchy and stability for pairwise equilibria are exactly 2 (Theorem 4.3). If
functions he are concave, we can always guarantee existence (Theorem 4.8). Our bounds for
concave functions in Section 3 imply tight bounds on the prices of anarchy and stability of
2. Most results in this section extend to strong equilibria. In fact, the arguments in all the
existence proofs can be adapted to show existence of strong equilibria, and tight bounds on
prices of anarchy and stability follow simply by restriction.
In Section 5 we briefly consider maximum effort games with reward functions fe(x, y) =
he(max(x, y)). For these games bilateral deviations essentially reduce to unilateral ones. Hence,
pairwise equilibria exist, they can be found by iterative better response using unilateral devia-
tions, and the price of stability is 1 (Theorem 5.2). In addition, we can show that the price of
anarchy is exactly 2, and this is tight (Theorem 5.3).
Sections 6 to 7 treat additional aspects of pairwise equilibria. In Section 6 we consider
approximate equilibria and show that a social optimum s∗ is always a 2-approximate equilibrium
(Theorem 6.1). In Section 7 we consider sequential and concurrent best response dynamics. We
show that for general convex functions and minimum effort games with concave functions the
dynamics converge to pairwise equilibria (Theorems 7.2 and 7.4). For the former we can even
provide a polynomial upper bound on the convergence times.
Note that allmost all of our results on the price of anarchy for pairwise equilibria result in
a (tight) bound of 2. This bound of 2 is essentially due to the dyadic nature of relationships,
i.e., the fact that edges are incident to at most two players. The case when edges are projects
among arbitrary subsets of actors is termed general contribution game and treated in Section 8.
Here we consider setwise equilibria, which allow deviations by subsets of players that are linked
via a joint project. For some classes of such games we show similar results for setwise equilibria
as for pairwise equilibria in network contributions games. In particular, we extend the results
on existence and price of anarchy for general convex functions and minimum effort games with
convex functions. The price of anarchy for setwise equilibria becomes essentially k, where k is
the cardinality of the largest project. However, many of the aspects of this general case remain
open, and we conclude the paper in Section 9 with this and other interesting avenues for further
research.
1.3 Related Work
The model most related to ours is the co-author model [30,31]. The motivation of this model is
very similar to ours, although there are many important differences. For example, in the usual
co-author model, the nodes cannot choose how to split their effort between their relationships,
only which relationship to participate in. Moreover, we consider general reward functions, and
as described above, our notion of pairwise stability is stronger than in [30,31].
Our games are potential games with respect to unilateral deviations and can thus be em-
bedded in the framework of congestion games. The social quality of Nash equilibrium in non-
splittable atomic congestion games, where the quality is measured by social welfare instead of
social cost, has been studied in [35]. Our games allow players to split their effort arbitrarily
between incident edges (i.e., they are atomic splittable congestion games [37]), and we focus on
coalitional equilibrium notions like pairwise stability, not Nash equilibrium. In addition, the
reward functions (e.g., in minimum effort games) are much more general and quite different
from delay functions usually treated in the congestion game literature [11,18].
In [14], Bramoulle´ and Kranton consider an extremely general model of network games
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designed to model public goods. Nevertheless, our game is not a special case of this model, since
in [14] the strategy of a node is simply a level of effort it contributes, not how much effort it
contributes to each relationship. There are many extensions to this model, e.g., Corbo et al. [20]
consider similar models in the context of contributions in peer-to-peer networks. Their work
closely connects to the seminal paper on contribution games by Ballester et al. [9], which has
prompted numerous similar follow-up studies.
The literature on games played in networks is too diverse to survey here – we will address
only the most relevant lines of research. In the last few years, there have been several fascinating
papers on network bargaining games (e.g., [16,33]), and in general on games played in networks
where every edge represents a two-player game (e.g., [21,22,29]). All these games either require
that every node plays the same strategy on all neighboring edges, or leaves the node free to play
any strategy on any edge. While every edge in our game can be considered to be a (very simple)
two-player game, the strategies/contributions that a node puts on every edge are neither the
same nor arbitrarily different: specifically they are constrained by a budget on the total effort
that a node can contribute to all neighboring edges in total. To the best of our knowledge, there
have been no contributions (other than the ones mentioned below) to the study of games of this
type.
Our game bears some resemblance to network formation games where players attempt to
maximize different forms of network centrality [2,10,15,25,32,34], although our utility functions
and equilibrium structure are very different. Minimum effort coordination games as proposed
by van Huyck et al. [39] represent a special case of our general model. They are a vital research
topic in experimental economics, see the papers mentioned above and [23] for a recent survey.
We study a generalized and networked variant in Section 4. Slightly different adjustments to
networks have recently appeared in [3, 12]. Our work complements this body of work with
provable guarantees on the efficiency of equilibria and the convergence times of dynamics.
Some of the special cases we consider are similar to stable matching [28], and in fact correlated
variants of stable matching can be considered an “integral” version of our game. Our results
generalize existence and convergence results for correlated stable matching (as, e.g., in [1]), and
our price of anarchy results greatly generalize the results of [6].
It is worth mentioning the connection of our reward functions with the “Combinatorial
Agency” framework (see, e.g., [7, 8]). In this framework, many people work together on one
project, and the success of this project depends in a complex (usually probabilistic) manner on
whether the people involved choose a high level of effort. It is an interesting open problem to
extend our results to the case in which every project of a game is an instance of the combinatorial
agency problem.
A related but much more coordinated framework is studied in charity auctions, which can
be used to obtain contributions of rational agents for charitable projects. This idea has been
first explored by Conitzer and Sandholm [19], and mechanisms for a social network setting are
presented by Ghosh and Mahdian [27].
2 Polynomials and Convex Reward Functions
In this section we start by considering a class of reward functions that guarantee a small price of
anarchy. We first introduce the notions of a coordinate-convex and coordinate-concave function.
Definition 2.1. A function f : Rn → R is
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• coordinate-convex if for all of its arguments xi, we have that ∂
2f
∂x2
i
≥ 0. A function is
strictly coordinate-convex if all these are strict inequalities.
• coordinate-concave if for all of its arguments xi, we have that ∂
2f
∂x2
i
≤ 0. A function is
strictly coordinate-concave if all these are strict inequalities.
Note that every convex function is coordinate-convex, and similarly every concave function
is coordinate-concave. However, coordinate-convexity/concavity is necessary but not sufficient
for convexity/concavity. For instance, the function log(1 + xy) is coordinate-concave, but not
concave – indeed, it is convex if x = y ∈ [0, 1].
Definition 2.2. Class C consists of all symmetric nondecreasing functions f : R≥0×R≥0 → R≥0
that are coordinate-convex. Define class C′ as the subclass of functions from C that are strictly
coordinate-convex. Define class C0 as the subclass of functions from C that satisfy f(x, 0) = 0
for all x ≥ 0.
The class C is of particular interest to us, because we can show the following result. The
proof will appear below in Section 2.2.
Theorem. For the class of network contribution games with reward functions fe ∈ C for all
e ∈ E that have a pairwise equilibrium, the prices of anarchy and stability for pairwise equilibria
are exactly 2.
Before we attack the proof, however, let us give some more intuition about functions that
belong to C and the properties of pairwise equilibria in the corresponding games. Consider
a polynomial p(x, y) in two variables with non-negative coefficients that is symmetric (i.e.,
p(x, y) = p(y, x)) and non-negative for x, y ≥ 0. For every such polynomial p we consider
all possible extensions to a function f(x, y) = h(p(x, y)) with h : R≥0 → R≥0 being nondecreas-
ing and convex. We call the union of all these extensions the class P. Clearly, every p(x, y) ∈ P
since h(x) = x is convex. In particular, P contains a large variety of functions such as xy,
(x+ y)2, ex+y, x3 + y3 + 2xy, etc. Observe that P ⊂ C, and thus the price of anarchy result for
C will hold for every game with arbitrary functions from P.
Claim 2.3. It holds that P ⊂ C.
Proof. Let f(x, y) = h(p(x, y)) be an arbitrary function in P as described above. f is clearly
monotone nondecreasing. ∂xxp, ∂yyp, and ∂xyp are non-negative, since p has positive coefficients.
∂xxf(x, y) = ∂pph(p(x, y)) · (∂xp(x, y))2 + ∂ph(p(x, y)) · ∂xxp(x, y) ≥ 0
since h is convex. The same holds for the other second partial derivatives.
2.1 Existence and Computational Complexity of Pairwise Equilibria
While we will show that the price of anarchy is 2 in Section 2.2, this result says nothing about
the existence and complexity of computing pairwise equilibria. In fact, even for simple games
with reward functions fe(x, y) = ce · (x + y) and small constants ce, pairwise equilibria can be
absent.
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Example 2.4. In our example there is a triangle graph with nodes u1, u2, and u3, edges
e1 = (u1, u2), e2 = (u2, u3), and e3 = (u3, u1), and uniform budgets. Edge ei has reward function
fi with f1(x, y) = f2(x, y) = 3(x + y), and f3(x, y) = 2(x + y). A pairwise equilibrium must
not allow profitable unilateral deviations. Thus, s1(e1) = s3(e2) = 1, because this is obviously a
dominant strategy w.r.t. unilateral deviations. Player 2 can assign his budget arbitrarily. This
yields w1(s) = 3 + 3s2(e1) and w3(s) = 3 + 3s2(e2). Changing to a state s
′ where u1 and u3
bilaterally deviate by moving all their budget to e3 yields w1(s
′) = 3s2(e1) + 4 > w1(s) and
w3(s
′) = 3s2(e2) + 4 > w3(s). Hence, no pairwise equilibrium exists.
Although there are games without pairwise equilibria, there is a large class of functions for
which we can show existence and an efficient algorithm for computation.
Theorem 2.5. A pairwise equilibrium always exists and can be computed efficiently when fe ∈ C0
for all e ∈ E.
Proof. We sort the edges in E in decreasing order by maximum possible reward cu,v = fu,v(Bu, Bv),
and let M be the result of a “greedy matching” algorithm for this order. Specifically, we add
edges to M in this decreasing order as long as adding the edge still results in a matching.
This algorithm can be made to run in O(m logm) time. We now show that every state s with
sv(e) = Bv iff e ∈ M is a pairwise equilibrium. The nodes that are not matched in M can
distribute their effort arbitrarily. Their payoff remains 0 since fe(x, 0) = 0.
We show the result by contradiction. First, suppose that a node v is willing to deviate
unilaterally. Without loss of generality, we can assume this deviation removes effort from an
edge of M , and adds all this effort to a single edge e = (v, u) 6∈M . We can assume this because
when forming its best response, v is maximizing the sum of convex functions under a budget
constraint (since all reward functions are coordinate-convex). This means that whenever v has
an improving unilateral deviation where it adds effort to several edges, it also has an improving
unilateral deviation where it adds all this effort to a single edge.
For any edge e = (v, u) 6∈ M such that u is matched in M , there is no reason for v to add
effort to e, since su(e) = 0 and fe(x, 0) = 0. If u is not matched in M , then by moving x effort
from edge e′ = (v, u′) ∈M to e, v will obtain utility at most fe(x,Bu)+ fe′(Bv −x,Bu′) instead
of fe(0, Bu) + fe′(Bv , Bu′). This being an improving deviation implies that
fe(x,Bu)− fe(0, Bu) > fe′(Bv , Bu′)− fe′(Bv − x,Bu′). (1)
Define ev(y) = fe(y,Bu) and e
′
v(y) = fe′(y,Bu′). Since e
′ is chosen before e by the greedy
algorithm, it must be that ce′ ≥ ce, and so ev(Bv) ≤ e′v(Bv). Since ev(0) = e′v(0) = 0, there
must be some interval of size x on which e′v increases at least as much as ev . But since both ev
and e′v are convex, the interval [0, x] must be the interval of smallest increase, and the interval
[Bv − x,Bv] is the interval of largest increase. This implies that
ev(x)− ev(0) ≤ e′v(Bv)− e′v(Bv − x) ,
a contradiction with Inequality 1. Therefore, we only need to address bilateral deviations.
Suppose that a node v is willing to deviate by switching some x amount of its effort from
edge e′ = (v, u′) ∈ M to edge e = (u, v) 6∈ M as part of a bilateral deviation with u. We can
assume w.l.o.g. that e′ was the first edge of Ev ∪Eu that was added to M , and so ce′ ≥ ce. For
v to be willing to deviate, it must be that Inequality 1 is satisfied. The rest of the argument
proceeds as before.
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xi kl
1
xikl
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1
xj kl
1
xjkl
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a
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7xy 7xy
3xy 3xy
7xy 7xy
3(x+ y)2(x+ y)
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Figure 1: Construction for the NP-hardness proof. Labels inside vertices indicate role of the
players, labels at vertices are budgets, and edge labels are reward functions. Vertices in the top
layer are decision players with budget 1 corresponding to variables. For each decision player
there are two adjacent assignment players (second layer) with budget kl that indicate setting the
decision variables. For each clause there is a triangle gadget (third and bottom layer) that by
itself has no pairwise equilibrium. Connections between assignment players and triangle gadgets
reflect the occurrences of variables in the clauses.
Theorem 2.5 establishes existence and efficient computation of equilibria for many functions
from class C. In particular, it shows existence for all convex functions fe that are 0-valued
when one of its arguments is 0, as well as for many non-convex ones, such as the weighted
product function fe(x, y) = ce · (xy). In fact, when considering deviations of arbitrary coalitions
of players, then it is easy to verify that the player of the coalition incident to the edge with
maximum possible reward (of all edges incident to the players in the coalition) does not make a
strict improvement in the deviation. Thus, as a corollary we get existence of strong equilibria.
Corollary 2.6. A strong equilibrium always exists and can be computed efficiently when fe ∈ C0
for all e ∈ E.
In general, we can show that deciding existence for pairwise equilibria for a given game
is NP-hard, even for very simple reward functions from C such as fe(x, y) = ce · (x + y) and
f(x, y) = ce · (xy) with constants ce > 0.
Theorem 2.7. It is NP-hard to decide if a network contribution game admits a pairwise equi-
librium even if all functions are either fe(x, y) = ce · (x+ y) or fe(x, y) = ce · (xy).
Proof. We reduce from 3SAT as follows. We consider a 3SAT formula with k variables and l
clauses. For each clause we insert the game of Example 2.4. For each variable we introduce
three players as follows. One is a decision player that has budget 1. He is connected to two
assignment players, one true player and one false player. Both the true and the false player
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have a budget of k · l. The edge between decision and assignment players has fe(x, y) = 7xy.
Finally, each assignment player is connected via an edge with fe(x, y) = 3xy to the player u3 of
every clause triangle, for which the corresponding clause has an occurrence of the corresponding
variable in the corresponding form (non-negated/negated).
Suppose the 3SAT instance has a satisfying assignment. We construct a pairwise equilibrium
as follows. If the variable in the assignment is set true (false), we make the decision player
contribute all his budget to the edge e to the false (true) assignment player. This assignment
player will contribute his full budget to e, because 7x has steeper slope than 3x, which is
the maximum slope attainable on the edges to the triangle gadgets. It is clear that none of
these players has an incentive to deviate (alone or with a neighbor). The remaining set of
assignment players A can now contribute their complete budget towards the triangle gadgets.
As the assignment is satisfying, every triangle player u3 of the triangle gadgets has at least one
neighboring assignment player in A. We now create a maximum bipartite matching between
players in A and the u3 players of the triangles. We then extend this and connect the remaining
(if any) triangle players arbitrarily to assignment players from A. This creates a one-to-many
matching of triangle players to players in A, with every triangle player being matched to exactly
one player in A, and some players in A possibly unmatched. We set each triangle player to
contribute all of his budget towards his edge in the matching. Each assignment player splits his
effort evenly between the incident edges in the matching; if the assignment player is unmatched
his strategy can be arbitrary. In this matching, each matched assignment player can get up to
l matching edges. As the triangle players contribute all their budget to their matching edge,
then each edge in the matching yields a reward of 3x, with x being the contribution of the
assignment player. By splitting his budget evenly, the assignment player contributes at least k
to each matching edge. Also he receives reward exactly 3kl, which is the maximum achievable
for a player in A (given that the decision player does not contribute to the incident edge). Thus,
every matched assignment player in A is stable and will not join a bilateral deviation. Consider
a triangle player u3. As the assignment player he is matched to contributes at least k (we assume
w.l.o.g. k ≥ 3), the reward function on the matching edge grows at least as quickly as 9y, i.e., with
a larger slope than the maximum slope achievable on the triangle edges. In addition, the reward
for u3 by contributing all budget to the matching edge is at least 9. Note that the maximum
payoff that he can obtain by contributing only to triangle edges is 8, and therefore he has no
incentive to join other triangle players in a deviation. Note that u3 could potentially achieve
higher revenue by deviating with a different assignment player in A. However, as noted above no
matched assignment player has an incentive to deviate jointly with u3. Hence, u3 can only join
an unmatched assignment player. This is only a profitable deviation if u3 currently shares his
current assignment player with at least one other triangle player. However, the possibility that
u3 could deviate to such an unmatched assignment player contradicts the fact that we created
a maximum matching between assignment and triangle players. Thus, u3 will also stick to his
strategy choice, and has no incentive to participate in bilateral or unilateral deviations. We can
stabilize the remaining pairs of triangle players by assigning an effort of 1 towards their joint
edge. Finally, the unmatched assignment players v in A are stable since their reward is always
0: no player adjacent to v puts any effort on edges incident to v, and no player adjacent to v is
willing to participate in a bilateral deviation due to the arguments above.
Now suppose there is a pairwise equilibrium. Note first that the decision player will always
contribute his full budget, and there is always a positive contribution of at least one assignment
player towards the decision player edge – otherwise there is a joint deviation that yields higher
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reward for both players. In particular, the decision player contributes only to edges, where the
maximum contribution of the assignment players is located. As the decision player contributes
his full budget, there is at least one incident edge that grows at least as quickly as 3.5x in the
contribution x of the assignment player. Hence, at least one assignment player will be motivated
to remove all contributions from the edges to the triangle players, as these edges grow at most by
3x in the contribution x of the assignment player. He will instead invest all of his budget towards
the decision player. This implies that every pairwise equilibrium must result in a decision for
the variable, i.e., if the (false) true assignment players contributes all of his budget towards the
decision player, the variable is set (true) false. If both players do this, the variable can be chosen
freely. As there is a stable state, the contributions of the remaining assignment players must
stabilize all triangle gadgets. In particular, this means that for each clause triangle there must
be at least one neighboring assignment player that does not contribute all of his budget towards
his decision player. This implies a satisfying assignment for the 3SAT instance.
Finally, let us focus on an interesting special case. The hardness in the previous theorem
comes from the interplay of reward functions xy that tend to a clustering of effort and x + y
that create cycles. We observed above that if all functions are ce · (xy), then equilibria exist and
can be computed efficiently. Here we show that for the case that fe(x, y) = ce · (x + y) for all
e ∈ E, we can decide efficiently if a pairwise equilibrium exists. Furthermore, if an equilibrium
exists, we can compute it in polynomial time.
Theorem 2.8. There is an efficient algorithm to decide the existence of a pairwise equilibrium,
and to compute one if one exists, when all reward functions are of the form fe(x, y) = ce · (x+y)
for arbitrary constants ce > 0. Moreover, the price of anarchy is 1 in this case.
Proof. Let S∗ be the set of socially optimum solutions. These are exactly the solutions where
every player v puts effort only on edges with maximum ce. S
∗ are exactly the solutions that are
stable against unilateral deviations, which immediately tells us that if a pairwise equilibrium
exists, then the price of anarchy is 1.
Not all solutions in S∗ are stable against bilateral deviations, however. Denote cv =
maxe∈Ev ce. Let E
∗
v be the set of edges incident to v with value cv. In any unilaterally sta-
ble solution, a node v must put all of its effort on edges in E∗v . We first show how to determine
if a pairwise stable solution exists if the only edges in the graph are ∪vE∗v .
Consider an edge e = (u, v) such that e ∈ E∗u but e 6∈ E∗v (call such an edge ”Type 1”). Then
in any pairwise stable solution, the node u must contribute all of its effort to edge e. Otherwise
u and v could deviate by v adding some amount ε > 0 to e, and u adding > ε(cv − cu)/cu to e.
This is possible for small enough ε, and would improve the reward for both u (by εcu) and v (by
> ε(cv − cu) − ε(cv − cu) = 0). Therefore, for every edge e = (u, v) of this type, we can fix the
contributions of node u, since they will be the same in any stable solution. If the same node u
has two or more such incident edges e, then by the above argument we immediately know that
there does not exist any pairwise equilibrium.
Now consider edges e = (u, v) which are in E∗u∩E∗v , which implies that cu = cv . For any such
edge, either cu(e) = Bu or cv(e) = Bv in any pairwise equilibrium. If this were not the case, then
both u and v could add some ε amount of effort to e and benefit from this deviation by 2εcu
amount. Consider a connected component consisting of such edges. We can use simple flow or
matching arguments to find if there exists an assignment of nodes to edges such that every edge
has at least one adjacent node assigned to it. We then set cu(e) = Bu if node u is assigned to
edge e. We also make sure not to assign a node that already used its budget on a Type 1 edge
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to any edge in this phase. As argued above, if such an assignment does not exist, then there is
no pairwise equilibrium. Conversely, any such assignment yields a pairwise equilibrium, since
for every edge, at least one of the endpoints of this edge is using all of its effort on this edge.
Thus we are able to determine exactly when pairwise equilibria exist on the set of edges ∪vE∗v .
Call the set of such solutions S.
All that is left to check is if one of these solutions is stable with respect to bilateral deviations
on edges e 6∈ ∪vE∗v . If one solution in S is a pairwise equilibrium in the entire graph, then all
of them are, since when moving effort onto an edge e, a node does not care which edge it
removes the effort from: all the edges with positive effort have the same slope. To verify that
a pairwise equilibrium exists, we simply consider every edge e = (u, v) 6∈ ∪vE∗v with reward
function ce · (x+ y), and check if (cu − ce)(cv − ce) ≥ c2e. We claim that a pairwise equilibrium
exists iff this is true for all edges.
Consider a bilateral deviation onto edge e where u contributes ε1 effort and v contributes
ε2 effort. This would be an improving deviation exactly when ceε2 > (cu − ce)ε1 and ceε1 >
(cv − ce)ε2. Fix ε1 > 0 to be some arbitrarily small value; then there exists ε2 satisfying
the above conditions exactly when (cu − ce)/ce < ce/(cv − ce), which is true exactly when
(cu − ce)(cv − ce) < c2e, as desired.
2.2 Price of Anarchy
This section is devoted to proving the following theorem.
Theorem 2.9. For the class of network contribution games with reward functions fe ∈ C for all
e ∈ E that have a pairwise equilibrium, the prices of anarchy and stability for pairwise equilibria
are exactly 2.
We will refer to an edge e = (u, v) as being slack if Bu > su(e) > 0 and Bv > sv(e) > 0,
half-slack if Bu > su(e) > 0 but sv(e) ∈ {Bv, 0}, and tight if su(e) ∈ {Bu, 0} and sv(e) ∈ {Bv, 0}.
We will call a solution tight if it has only tight edges.
Claim 2.10. If all reward functions belong to class C, then there always exists a tight optimum
solution. If all reward functions belong to class C′, then all optimum solutions are tight.
Proof. Let s be a solution with maximum social welfare, and let node v be a node that uses
non-zero effort on two adjacent edges: e = (u, v) and e′ = (w, v). For simplicity, we will denote
fe by f and fe′ by g. Furthermore, we denote su(e) by αu, sv(e) by αv, sv(e
′) by βv , sw(e
′) by
βw. The fact that v switching an ε amount of effort from e to e
′ or from e′ to e does not increase
the social welfare means that:
f(αv + ε, αu)− f(αv, αu) ≤ g(βv , βw)− g(βv − ε, βw) (2)
and that
g(βv + ε, βw)− g(βv , βw) ≤ f(αv, αu)− f(αv − ε, αu). (3)
We know from coordinate-convexity that g(βv , βw)−g(βv−ε, βw) ≤ g(βv+ε, βw)−g(βv , βw).
Therefore, we have that
f(αv + ε, αu)− f(αv, αu) ≤ f(αv, αu)− f(αv − ε, αu). (4)
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This is not possible if f is in C′, giving us a contradiction, and completing the proof for
f ∈ C′. For f ∈ C, this tells us that v moving its effort from one of these edges to the other will
not change the social welfare, and so we can create an optimum solution with one less half-slack
edge by setting ε = min(αv , βv). We can continue this process to end up with a tight optimum
solution, as desired.
Proof of Theorem 2.9. Let s be a pairwise stable solution, and s∗ an optimum solution. By
Claim 2.10 we can assume that s∗ is tight.
Define we(s) to be the reward of edge e in s, and we(s
∗) to be the reward of e in s∗. Recall
that for a node v, the utility of v is wv(s) =
∑
e∈Ev
we(s). Let e = (u, v) be an arbitrary tight
edge in s∗. If s∗u(e) = Bu and s
∗
v(e) = Bv, then consider the bilateral deviation from s where both
u and v put all their effort on edge e. Since s is pairwise stable, there must be some node (wlog
node u) such that wu(s) ≥ we(s∗) = fe(Bu, Bv). Make this node u a witness for edge e. If instead
s∗u(e) = Bu and s
∗
v(e) = 0, then consider the unilateral deviation from s where u puts all its
effort on edge e. Since s is stable against unilateral deviation, then wu(s) ≥ we(s∗) = fe(Bu, 0).
Make this node u a witness for edge e.
Notice that every node can be a witness for at most one edge, since for a node u to be a
witness to edge e, it must be that s∗u(e) = Bu. Therefore, we know that
∑
v wv(s) ≥
∑
ewe(s
∗).
Since the total social welfare in s∗ is exactly 2
∑
ewe(s
∗), we know that the price of anarchy for
pairwise equilibria is at most 2.
Finally, let us establish tightness of this bound. Consider a path of four nodes with uniform
budgets and edges e1 = (u, v),e2 = (v,w) and e3 = (w, z). The reward functions are fe1(x, y) =
fe3(x, y) = xy and fe2(x, y) = (1+ε)xy. v and w achieve their maximum reward by contributing
their full budget to e2, hence they will apply this strategy in every pairwise equilibrium. This
leaves no reward for u and z and gives a total welfare of 2 + 2ε. If the players contribute only
to e1 and e3, the total welfare is 4. Hence, the price of stability for pairwise equilibria is at least
2, which matches the upper bound on the price of anarchy. 
For completeness, we also present a result similar to Claim 2.10 for pairwise equilibrium
solutions.
Claim 2.11. If all reward functions belong to class C, with every reward function fe having the
property that ∂
2fe
∂x∂y
≥ 0, then for every pairwise equilibrium, there exists a pairwise equilibrium
of the same welfare without slack edges.
Proof. Let s be a pairwise stable solution, and suppose it contains a slack edge e = (u, v).
This means that nodes u and v have other adjacent edges where they are contributing non-
zero effort. Let those edges be e1 = (u,w1) and e2 = (v,w2). For simplicity, we will denote fe,
by f , fe1 by f1, and fe2 by f2. Furthermore, we denote sv(e) by αv, su(e) by αu, su(e1) by βu,
sv(e2) by γv and for w1 and w2 accordingly.
For any value ε ≤ min{αu, βu}, it must be that u cannot unilaterally deviate by moving
ε effort from e to e1, or from e1 to e. Therefore, we know that f(αu + ε, αv) − f(αu, αv) ≤
f1(βu, βw1)− f1(βu− ε, βw1), and that f1(βu + ε, βw1)− f1(βu, βw1) ≤ f(αu, αv)− f(αu− ε, αv).
Since f and f1 are coordinate-convex, however, we know that f(αu, αv) − f(αu − ε, αv) ≤
f(αu + ε, αv) − f(αu, αv) (and similarly for f1), which implies that the above inequalities hold
with equality. Specifically, it implies that for both f and f1, increasing u’s effort by ε causes the
same difference in utility as decreasing it by ε. This simply quantifies the fact that for a node
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to put effort on more than one edge in a stable solution, it should be indifferent between those
two edges.
For any ε ≤ min{αv , αu, βu, γv}, consider the pairwise deviation where u and v both move ε
amount of effort to e from e1 and e2. Suppose w.l.o.g. that node u is not willing to deviate in
this manner because it does not increase its utility. This means that
f(αu + ε, αv + ε)− f(αu, αv) ≤ f1(βu, βw1)− f1(βu − ε, βw1). (5)
By the above argument about u’s unilateral deviations, we know that f1(βu, βw1)− f1(βu −
ε, βw1) = f(αu+ ε, αv)− f(αu, αv), and so we have that f(αu+ ε, αv+ ε) = f(αu+ ε, αv). Since
∂2f
∂x∂y
≥ 0, this also implies that f(αu, αv + ε) = f(αu, αv).
We now create solution s′ by having node v move ε effort from edge e2 to e. We will prove
below that s′ is also a pairwise stable solution of the same welfare as s. However, it has strictly
more effort on edge e. We can continue applying the same arguments for edge e until e is no
longer a slack edge. This process only decreases the number of slack edges, since we only remove
effort from edges that are slack or half-slack, and in the latter case we remove the effort from
the ”slack” direction, so the edge remains half-slack afterwards.
All that is left to prove is that s′ is pairwise stable of the same welfare as s. To see that
the welfare is the same, notice that we can use for node v the same arguments for unilateral
deviations that we applied to u. Therefore, we know that
f(αu, αv + ε)− f(αu, αv) = f2(γw2 , γv)− f2(γw2 , γv − ε) = 0.
Therefore, the reward of all edges in s′, and thus the utility of all nodes, is the same as in s, so
the social welfare of both is the same.
We must now prove that s′ is pairwise stable. Any possibly improving deviation would
have to include one of the edges e = (u, v) or e2 = (v,w2), since for all other edges the effort
levels are the same in s and s′. First consider deviations (unilateral or bilateral) including node
v. Any such deviation would also be a valid deviation in s, since only the strategy of node v
has changed. Therefore, all such deviations cannot be improving deviations. Next consider any
unilateral deviation by u where u adds some δ effort to edge e. For this to be a strictly improving
deviation, it must be that f(αu + δ, αv + ε) − f(αu, αv + ε) > 0. Consider instead a bilateral
deviation from s where u plays the new strategy (i.e., adds δ to e), while v deviates by moving
ε from e2 to e. In this deviation, u strictly benefits since it ends in the same configuration as
above, and v strictly benefits since it loses f2(γw2 , γv) − f2(γw2 , γv − ε) = 0 utility and gains
f(αu + δ, αv + ε)− f(αu, αv) > 0 utility. Therefore, this contradicts s being pairwise stable.
Next consider a deviation from s′ where u removes some amount δ from e. For this deviation
to be profitable in s′, but not profitable in s, it must be that f(αu, αv + ε)− f(αu− δ, αv + ε) <
f(αu, αv)− f(αu − δ, αv). This contradicts the fact that ∂
2f
∂x∂y
≥ 0.
Finally, consider deviations by node w2. If w2 deviates and removes some amount δ from e2,
then this is profitable only if f2(γw2 , γv − ε)− f2(γw2 − δ, γv − ε) < f2(γw2 , γv)− f2(γw2 − δ, γv).
Recall, however, that f2(γw2 , γv) = f2(γw2 , γv−ε), so the above implies that f2(γw2−δ, γv−ε) >
f2(γw2 − δ, γv), which is impossible since f2 is nondecreasing in both its arguments. If w2 adds
effort to e2 in its deviation, then it cannot possibly be more profitable than the same deviation
in s, since v is using less effort on e2 in s
′ than in s, and the utility of edge e1 is the same in
both. This finishes the proof.
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Corollary 2.12. If all reward functions belong to class C′, then all pairwise equilibria have only
tight edges.
Proof. In the proof of Claim 2.11, we saw that if a node is putting non-zero effort on two edges,
then it must be that for some edge e and values x, y, we have that fe(x + ε, y) − fe(x, y) =
fe(x, y) − fe(x − ε, y). This is not possible for fe ∈ C′, since fe is strictly convex in each of its
arguments.
Corollary 2.13. If all reward functions belong to class C, then all strict pairwise equilibria
(where every player has a unique unilateral best response) have only tight edges.
Proof. In the proof of Claim 2.11, we saw that if a node is putting non-zero effort on two edges,
then its utility does not change by moving some amount of effort from one of these edges to the
other. This is not possible in a strict pairwise equilibrium, since then this node would have a
deviation that does not change its utility.
3 Concave Reward Functions
In this section we consider the case when reward functions fe(x, y) are concave. It is simple to
observe that a pairwise equilibrium may not exist. Consider a triangle graph with three players,
uniform budgets, and fe(x, y) =
√
xy for all edges. Every player has an incentive to invest his
full budget due to monotonic increasing functions. Due to concavity each player will even out the
contributions according to the derivatives. Thus, the only candidate for a pairwise equilibrium
is when all players put 0.5 on each incident edge. It is, however, easy to see that this state is no
pairwise equilibrium. Although we might have no pairwise equilibrium, we obtain the following
general result for games with concave rewards that have a pairwise equilibrium.
Theorem 3.1. For the class of network contribution games with concave reward functions for
all e ∈ E that have a pairwise equilibrium, the price of anarchy for pairwise equilibria is at most
2.
Proof. Consider a social optimum s∗, and the effort s∗v(e) used by node v on edge e in this
solution. Let s be a pairwise equilibrium, with sv(e) the effort used by v on edge e in s. For an
edge e = (u, v), let we(s) = fe(su(e), sv(e)) be its reward in s, and we(s
∗) = fe(s
∗
u(e), s
∗
v(e)) be
its reward in s∗. We will now attempt to charge w(s∗) to w(s).
For any node v, define Ov to be the set of edges incident to v where v contributes strictly
more in s∗ than in s, i.e., where s∗v(e) > sv(e). Similarly, define S
v to be the set of edges e where
s∗v(e) ≤ sv(e).
Let O be the set of edges e with strictly higher reward in s∗ than in s (we(s
∗) > we(s)), and
S be the rest of the edges in the graph, with reward in s at least as high as in s∗. Furthermore,
define O1 = {e = (u, v)|e ∈ Ou ∩ Sv ∩ O} and O2 = {e = (u, v)|e ∈ Ou ∩ Ov ∩ O}. In other
words, O2 is the set of edges with higher reward in s
∗ where both players contribute more
in s∗ than in s, and O1 is the set of edges where only one player does so. Similarly, define
S1 = {e = (u, v)|e ∈ Ou∩Sv ∩S} and S2 = {e = (u, v)|e ∈ Su∩Sv ∩S}. Since reward functions
are monotone, every edge must appear in exactly one of O1, O2, S1, or S2.
In the following proof, we will first show that any edge e = (u, v) in O can be assigned to
one of its endpoints (say u) such that u would never gain in deviating from s by removing effort
from edges in Su and making its contribution to e equal to s∗u(e), even if v did the same. This
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means that the utility node u looses from setting its contribution to s∗u(e) instead of su(e) on
all edges of Su is at least as much as the difference in utility in s∗ versus in s on all the edges of
O assigned to u. We then sum up these inequalities, which lets us bound the reward on edges
where s∗ is better than s by the reward on edges where s is better than s∗. We now proceed
with the proof as described.
Let e = (u, v) be an arbitrary edge of O, so we(s
∗) > we(s). Since fe is nondecreasing, this
implies that sv(e) < s
∗
v(e) or su(e) < s
∗
u(e), i.e., at least one of u or v has strictly lower effort on
e in s than in s∗. Consider the deviation from s to another state s′ where u and v increase their
contributions to e to the same level as in s∗, i.e., a state s′ yields s′u(e) = max{su(e), s∗u(e)} and
s′v(e) = max{sv(e), s∗v(e)}. This may be either a bilateral or a unilateral deviation, depending
on whether one of s′u(e) = su(e) or s
′
v(e) = sv(e) holds. Note that there is actually an entire set
of such states s′, as we did not specify from where players u and v potentially remove effort to
be able to achieve the increase. Observe, however, that no other player changes his strategy, i.e.,
s′−u,v = s−u,v. Since s is an equilibrium, it must be that for at least one of u or v the deviation
to every possible such state s′ is unprofitable. Without loss of generality, say that this player is
u, so wu(s
′) ≤ wu(s) for every state s′, and we say that we assign edge e to node u. Note that
this implies that δu(e) = s
∗
u(e) − su(e) > 0, i.e., e ∈ Ou, since otherwise all edges incident to u
would have the same reward in every s′ as in s, except for the edge e which would have reward
we(s
∗) in s′, strictly greater than we(s).
Since fe(s
′
u(e), s
′
v(e)) ≥ we(s∗), then there is an increase in wu due to e of at least we(s∗)−
we(s). However, as every deviation to a state s
′ is unprofitable for u, it must be that removing
δu(e) effort in any arbitrary way from other edges incident to u and adding it to e would not
increase u’s utility wu. Therefore, we know that, in particular, removing δu(e) effort from edges
Su decreases the reward of those edges by at least we(s
∗) − we(s). Denote by χu(δu(e)) this
amount, i.e, χu(δ) is the minimum amount that wu would decrease if in state s player u removed
any δ amount of effort from edges in Su.
We have now proven that for any e = (u, v) ∈ O, we can assign it to one of its endpoints
(say u), such that χu(δu(e)) ≥ we(s∗)−we(s). We can now sum these inequalities for every edge
e ∈ O. Consider the sum of just the inequalities corresponding to the edges assigned to a fixed
node v (call this set of edges A(v)). Then we have that
∑
e∈A(v)
[we(s
∗)− we(s)] ≤
∑
e∈A(v)
χv(δv(e)) .
How does χv(δ1) + χv(δ2) compare to χv(δ1 + δ2)? Since all the functions fe are concave, it is
easy to see that removing δ1+ δ2 effort from edges Sv will decrease the reward of these edges by
at least as much as the sum of χv(δ1) and χv(δ2). Therefore, we know that
∑
e∈A(v)
χv(δv(e)) ≤ χv

 ∑
e∈A(v)
δv(e)

 .
Since δv(e) is the extra effort of v on edge e in s
∗ compared to s, the sum of δv(e) for the edges
Ov equals ∆ =
∑
e∈Sv sv(e) − s∗v(e). Thus, χv(∆) is at most the utility lost by v if, starting at
state s, v would set its contribution to s∗v(e) instead of sv(e) on all edges of S
v. For an edge
e ∈ S2, this is at most we(s) − we(s∗), since even after lowering v’s contribution to s∗v(e), the
reward of this edge is at least we(s
∗). For an edge e ∈ S1 or e ∈ O1, this is still at most we(s).
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Noticing that an edge of Sv cannot be in O2, we now have that
χv(∆) ≤
∑
e∈Sv∩S2
[we(s)− we(s∗)] +
∑
e∈Sv∩(S1∪O1)
we(s) .
Putting this all together, we obtain that
∑
e∈A(v)
[we(s
∗)− we(s)] ≤
∑
e∈Sv∩S2
[we(s)− we(s∗)] +
∑
e∈Sv∩(S1∪O1)
we(s) .
Summing up these inequalities for all nodes v, we obtain a way to bound the reward on edges
where s∗ is better than s by the reward on edges where s is better than s∗. Since the same edge
e = (u, v) could be in both Su and Sv, it may be used in the above sum twice. Notice, however,
that any edge in S1 or O1 will only appear in this sum once, since it will belong to S
v of exactly
one node. Thus, we obtain that
∑
e∈O
[we(s
∗)− we(s)] ≤ 2
∑
e∈S2
[we(s)−we(s∗)] +
∑
e∈S1∪O1
we(s) .
Adding in the edges of S1, and recalling that all edges are in exactly one of O1, O2, S1, or S2,
gives us the desired bound:
w(s∗) ≤ 2
∑
e∈S2
we(s) +
∑
e∈S1∪O1
we(s) +
∑
e∈O
we(s) +
∑
e∈S1
we(s) ≤ 2w(s) .
Looking carefully at the proof of the previous theorem yields the following result (c.f. Defi-
nition 2.1).
Corollary 3.2. For the class of network contribution games with coordinate-concave reward
functions for all e ∈ E that have a pairwise equilibrium, the price of anarchy for pairwise
equilibria is at most 2.
4 Minimum Effort Games
In this section we consider the interesting case (studied for example in [5,17,24,26,38,39]) when
all reward functions are of the form fe(x, y) = he(min(x, y)). In other words, the reward of
an edge depends only on the minimum effort of its two endpoints. In our treatment we again
distinguish between the case of increasing marginal returns (convex functions he) and diminishing
marginal returns (concave functions he). Note that in this case bilateral deviations are in many
ways essential to make the game meaningful, as there is almost always an infinite number of
Nash equilibria.2 In addition, we can assume w.l.o.g. that in every pairwise equilibrium s there
is a unique value se for each e = (u, v) ∈ E such that sv(e) = su(e) = se. The same can be
assumed for optima s∗.
We begin by showing a simple yet elegant proof based on linear programming duality, that
shows a price of anarchy of 2 when all functions he(x) = ce · x are linear with slope ce > 0. We
include this proof to highlight that duality is also used in Theorem 4.3 for convex functions and
uniform budgets.
2In particular, due to monotonic increasing functions any state in which for each edge the contributions of
incident players are the same is a Nash equilibrium.
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Theorem 4.1. The prices of anarchy and stability for pairwise equilibria in games with all
functions of the form fe(x, y) = ce ·min(x, y) are exactly 2.
Proof. We use linear programming duality to obtain the result. Consider an arbitrary pairwise
equilibrium s and an optimum s∗. Note that the problem of finding s∗ can be formulated as the
following linear program, with variables xe representing the minimum contribution to edge e:
Max
∑
e∈E
2cexe
s.t.
∑
e:e=(u,v)
xe ≤ Bu for all u ∈ V
xe ≥ 0 .
(6)
The LP-dual of this program is
Min
∑
u∈V
Buyu
s.t. yu + yv ≥ 2ce for all e ∈ E
yu ≥ 0 .
(7)
Now consider the pairwise equilibrium s and a candidate dual solution y composed of
yu =
∑
e:e=(u,v)
cese
Bu
.
If a player contributes all of his budget in s, this is the average payoff per unit of effort. Note
that {se} is a feasible primal, and
∑
e 2cese =
∑
u yuBu, but {yu} is not a feasible dual solution.
Now suppose that for an edge e both incident players u and v have yu, yv < ce. Then both
incident players can either move effort from an edge with below-average payoff to e, or invest
some of their remaining budget on e. This increases both their payoffs and contradicts that s
is stable. Thus, for every edge e there is a player u with yu ≥ ce. Thus, by setting y′u = 2yu
we obtain a feasible dual solution with profit of twice the profit of s. The upper bound follows
by standard duality arguments. It is straightforward to derive a tight lower bound on the price
of stability using a path of length 3 and functions he(x) = x and he(x) = (1 + ε)x in a similar
fashion as presented in Theorem 2.9 previously.
4.1 Convex Functions in Minimum Effort Games
In this section we consider reward functions fe(x, y) = he(min(x, y)) with convex functions he(x).
This case bears some similarities with our treatment of the class C in Section 2. In fact, we can
show existence of pairwise equilibria in games with uniform budgets. We call an equilibrium s
integral if se ∈ {0, 1} for all e ∈ E.
Theorem 4.2. A pairwise equilibrium always exists in games with uniform budgets and fe(x, y) =
he(min(x, y)) when all he are convex. If all he are strictly convex, all pairwise equilibria are in-
tegral.
Proof. We first show how to construct a pairwise equilibrium. The proof is basically again an
adaptation of the “greedy matching” argument that was used to show existence for general
convex functions in Theorem 2.8. In the beginning all players are asleep. We iteratively wake
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up the pair of sleeping players that achieves the highest revenue on a joint edge and assign them
to contribute their total budget towards this edge. The algorithm stops when there is no pair
of incident sleeping players.
Suppose for contradiction that the resulting assignment is not a pairwise equilibrium. First
consider a bilateral deviation, where a pair of players can profit from re-assigning some budget
to an edge e′. By our algorithm at least one of the players incident to e′ is awake. Consider the
incident player u that was woken up earlier. If it is profitable for him to remove some portion
x of effort from an edge e to e′, this implies
he(1) < he(1− x) + he′(x)
However, our choices imply he(1) ≥ he′(1). Convexity yields he′(x) ≤ xhe′(1) and he(1 − x) ≤
(1− x)he(1) and results in a contradiction
he(1) < he(1− x) + he′(x)
≤ (1− x)he(1) + xhe′(1)
≤ (1− x)he(1) + xhe(1)
= he(1) .
This implies that the algorithm computes a stable state with respect to bilateral deviations.
As for unilateral deviations, no player would ever add any effort to an edge where the other
endpoint is putting in zero effort. However, if a player u unilaterally re-assigns some x budget
to an edge e′ = (u, v) from edge e with v still being asleep at the end of the algorithm, then this
implies that he(1) < he(1 − x) + he′(x) and that he(1) ≥ he′(1). This gives a contradiction by
the same argument as above.
If all functions are strictly convex, then he(x) < xhe(1) for all x ∈ (0, 1). In this case we
show that every stable state s is integral, i.e., we have se ∈ {0, 1}. Suppose to the contrary that
there is an equilibrium s with se ∈ (0, 1) for e = (u, v). Let e be an edge with the largest value
he(1) such that se ∈ (0, 1). For player u, let ei with i = 1, ... be other incident edges of u such
that sei ∈ (0, 1). Then, because of strict convexity, we have
he(se) +
∑
i
hei(sei) < sehe(1) +
∑
i
seihei(1) ≤ he(1) .
This means u has an incentive to move all of his effort to e if v does the same. By the same
argument, v also has an incentive to move all its effort to e. Thus, the bilateral deviation of
u and v moving their effort to e is an improving deviation for both u and v, so we have a
contradiction to s being stable.
Theorem 4.3. The prices of anarchy and stability for pairwise equilibria in network contribution
games are exactly 2 when all reward functions fe(x, y) = he(min(x, y)) with convex he, and
budgets are uniform.
Proof. Consider a stable solution s and an optimum solution s∗. For a vertex u we consider
the profit and denote this by yu =
∑
e:e=(u,v) fe(se). For every edge e = (u, v), consider the case
when both players invest the full effort. Due to convexity s∗e · fe(1) ≥ fe(s∗e). Suppose for both
players yu, yv < fe(1). Then there is a profitable switch by allocating all effort to e. This implies
that max{yu, yv} ≥ fe(1) and thus,
(yu + yv) · s∗e ≥ s∗efe(1) ≥ fe(s∗e) .
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Thus, we can bound ∑
e∈E
(yu + yv) · s∗e ≥
∑
e∈E
fe(s
∗
e) = w(s
∗)/2 .
On the other hand
∑
e∈E
(yu + yv) · s∗e =
∑
u∈V
∑
e:e=(u,v)
yu · s∗e ≤
∑
u∈V
yu = 2
∑
e∈E
fe(se) = w(s) .
Hence, w(s) ≥ w(s∗)/2 and the price of anarchy is 2.
Note that this is tight for functions f that are arbitrarily convex. The example is a path of
length 3 similar to Theorem 2.9 and Theorem 4.1. We use fe(1) = 1 + ε for the inner edge and
fe(1) = 1 for the outer edges, and the price of stability becomes arbitrarily close to 2.
For the case of arbitrary budgets and convex functions, however, we can again find an
example that does not allow a pairwise equilibrium.
Example 4.4. Our example game consists of a path of length 3. We denote the vertices along
this path with u, v, w, z. All players have budget 2, except for player z that has budget 1. The
profit functions are hu,v(x) = 2x
2, hv,w(x) = 5x, and hw,z(x) = 6x. Observe that this game
allows no pairwise equilibrium: If 2 ≥ sv,w > 1, then player w has an incentive to increase the
effort towards z. If 1 ≥ sv,w > 0, then player v has an incentive to increase effort towards u. If
sv,w = 0, both v and w can jointly increase their profits by contributing 2 on (v,w).
Using this example we can construct games in which deciding existence of pairwise equilibria
is hard.
Theorem 4.5. It is NP-hard to decide if a network contribution game admits a pairwise equi-
librium if budgets are arbitrary and all functions are fe(x, y) = he(min(x, y)) with convex he.
Proof. We reduce from 3SAT and use a similar reduction to the one given in Theorem 2.7. An
instance of 3SAT is given by k variables and l clauses. For each clause we construct a simple
game of Example 4.4 that has no stable state. For each variable we introduce three players
as follows. One is a decision player that has budget k · l. He is connected to two assignment
players, one true player and one false player. Both these players have also a budget of k · l.
The edge between decision and assignment players has he(x) = 10x
2. Finally, each assignment
player is connected via an edge with he(x) = 7x to the node z of every clause path, for which
the corresponding clause has an occurrence of the corresponding variable in the corresponding
form (non-negated/negated). Note that the connecting player z is the only player with budget
1 in the clause path.
Suppose the 3SAT instance has a satisfying assignment. We construct a stable state as
follows. If the variable is set true (false), we make the decision player contribute all his budget
to the edge e to the false (true) assignment player. Both assignment player and decision player
are motivated to contribute their full budget to e, because 10(kl)2 is the maximum profit that
they will ever be able to obtain. Clearly, none of these players has an incentive to deviate
(alone or with a neighbor). The remaining set of assignment players A can now contribute their
complete budget towards the clause gadgets. As the assignment is satisfying, every node z of
the clause gadgets has at least one neighboring assignment player in A. We create a maximum
bipartite matching of clause players z to players in A and match the remaining clause players z
(if any) to players from A arbitrarily. Each clause player z contributes all of his budget towards
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his edge in this one-to-many matching. Each assignment player splits his effort evenly between
the incident edges in the matching. Note that the players z from the clause gadgets now receive
profit 7, which is the maximum achievable. Thus, they have no incentive to deviate. Hence,
no player in A has a profitable unilateral or a possible bilateral deviation. Finally, we obtain a
stable state in the clause gadgets by assigning all players v and w to contribute 2 to (v,w).
Now suppose there is a stable state. Note first that the decision player and one incident
assignment player can and will obtain their maximum profit by contributing their full budgets
towards a joint edge – otherwise there is a joint deviation that yields higher profit for both
players. Hence, this assignment player will not contribute to edges to the clause gadget players.
This implies a decision for the variable, i.e., if the (false) true assignment players contributes all
of his budget towards the decision player, the variable is set (true) false. As there is a stable
state, the contributions of the remaining assignment players must stabilize all clause gadgets.
In particular, this means that for each clause triangle there must be at least one neighboring
assignment player that does not contribute towards his decision player. This implies that the
assignment decisions made by the decision players must be satisfying for the 3SAT instance.
The construction of Example 4.4 and the previous proof can be extended to show hardness
for games with uniform budgets in which functions are either concave or convex.
Corollary 4.6. In games with uniform budgets and functions fe(x, y) = he(min(x, y)) with
monotonic increasing he it is NP-hard to determine if a pairwise equilibrium exists.
Proof. We use the same approach as in the previous proof, however, we assign each player a
budget of Bu = k · l. For each of the players u, v, w, and z in a clause gadget we introduce
players u′, v′, w′ and z′. u′ is only connected to u, v′ only to v, and similar for w′ and z′. The
edges (u, u′), (v, v′) and (w,w′) have profit function he(x) = 10 ·(kl−2)1.5 ·
√
x for x ≤ kl−2 and
he(x) = 10(kl − 2)2 otherwise. Similarly, we use he(x) = 10 · (kl − 1)1.5 ·
√
x for x ≤ kl − 1 and
he(x) = 10(kl− 1)2 otherwise for (z, z′). It is easy to observe that in every pairwise equilibrium
players u and u′ will contribute kl − 2 towards their joint edge. This holds accordingly for
every other pair of players (v, v′), (w,w′) and (z, z′). The remaining budgets of the players are
the budgets used in Example 4.4 above and lead to the same arguments in the above outlined
reduction.
Finally, we observe that the existence result in Theorem 4.2 extends to strong equilibria. In
particular, whenever we consider a deviation from a coalition of players, the reward of players
incident to the highest reward edge do not strictly improve by the deviation. In addition, the
prices of anarchy and stability are 2 because our lower bound examples continue to hold for
strong equilibria, while the upper bounds follow by restriction.
Corollary 4.7. A strong equilibrium always exists in games with uniform budgets and fe(x, y) =
he(min(x, y)) when all he are convex. If all he are strictly convex, all strong equilibria are
integral. The prices of anarchy and stability for strong equilibria in these games are exactly 2.
4.2 Concave Functions in Minimum Effort Games
In this section we consider the case of diminishing returns, i.e., when all he are concave func-
tions. Note that in this case the function fe = he(min(x, y)) is coordinate-concave. Therefore,
the results from Section 3 show that the price of anarchy is at most 2. However, for general
coordinate-concave functions it is not possible to establish the existence of pairwise equilibria,
21
which we do for concave he below. In fact, if the functions he are strictly concave, we can show
that the equilibrium is unique.
Theorem 4.8. A pairwise equilibrium always exists in games with fe(x, y) = he(min(x, y)) when
all he are continuous, piecewise differentiable, and concave. It is possible to compute pairwise
equilibria efficiently within any desired precision. Moreover, if all he are strictly concave, then
this equilibrium is unique.
Proof. First, notice that we can assume without loss of generality that for every edge e = (u, v),
the function he is constant for values greater than min(Bu, Bv). This is because it will never be
able to reach those values in any solution.
We create a pairwise equilibrium in an iterative manner. For any solution and set of nodes S,
define BRv(S) as the set of best responses for node v if it can control the strategies of nodes S.
We begin by computing BRv(V ) independently for each player v (V is the set of all nodes). In
particular, this simulates that v is the player that always creates the minimum of every edge, and
we pick sv such that it maximizes
∑
e=(u,v) he(sv(e)). This is a concave maximization problem
(or equivalently a convex minimization problem), for which it is possible to find a solution by
standard methods in time polynomial in the size of G, the encoding of the budgets Bv and the
number of bits of precision desired for representing the solution. For background on efficient
algorithms for convex minimization see, e.g., [36].
Let h+e (x) be the derivative of he(x) in the positive direction, and h
−
e (x) be the derivative
of he(x) in the negative direction. We have the property that for sv calculated as above, for
every edge e with sv(e) > 0 it holds that h
−
e (sv(e)) ≥ h+e′(sv(e′)) for every edge e′ incident to v.
Define h′v as the minimum value of h
−
e (sv(e)) for all edges e incident to v with sv(e) > 0.
Our algorithm proceeds as follows. At the start all players are asleep, and in each iteration
we pick one player to wake up. Let Si denote the set of sleeping players in iteration i, and
Ai = V − Si the set of awake players; in the beginning S1 = V . We will call edges with both
endpoints asleep sleeping edges, and all other edges awake edges.
In each iteration i, we pick one player to wake up, and fix its contributions on all of its
adjacent edges. In particular, we choose a node v ∈ Si with the currently highest derivative
value h′v (see below for tie-breaking rule). We set v’s contribution to an edge e = (u, v) to
sv(e), where sv ∈ BRv(Si). Define BRv(Si) as the set of best responses in BRv(Si) for which
sv(e) = su(e) for all awake edges e = (u, v). For sv ∈ BRv(Si) player v exactly matches the
contributions of the awake nodes Ai on all awake edges between v and Ai. By Lemma 4.10
below, BRv(Si) is non-empty, and our algorithm sets the contributions of v to sv ∈ BRv(Si).
Moreover, we set the contribution of other sleeping players u ∈ Si to be su(e) = sv(e) on the
sleeping edges, so we assume u fully matches v’s contribution on edge e. By Lemma 4.10, u
will not change its contributions on these edges when it is woken up. Thus, in the final solution
output by the algorithm v will receive exactly the reward of BRv(Si). Now that node v is awake,
we compute BRu(Si − {v}) for all sleeping u, as well as new values h′u and iterate. Note that
values h′u in later iterations are defined as the minimum derivative values on all the sleeping
edges neighboring u, not on all edges. To summarize, each iteration i of the algorithm proceeds
as follows:
• For every u ∈ Si, compute su ∈ BRu(Si).
• For every u ∈ Si, set h′u to be the minimum value of h−e (su(e)) for all sleeping edges e
incident to u with su(e) > 0.
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• Choose a node v with maximum h′v (using tie-breaking rule below), fix v’s strategy to be
sv, and set Si+1 = Si − {v}.
To fully specify the algorithm, we need to define a tie-breaking rule for choosing a node
to wake up when there are several nodes with equal values h′v. Let sv ∈ BRv(Si) that we
compute. Our goal is that for every edge e = (u, v) with h′u = h
′
v, we choose node u such
that su(e) ≤ sv(e). We claim that we can always find a node u such that this is true with
respect to all its neighbors. Suppose a node u has two edges e = (u, v) and e′ = (u,w) with
h′u = h
′
v = h
′
w and su(e) > sv(e) but su(e
′) < sw(e
′). Lemma 4.9 below implies that the
functions on (u, v) and (u,w) are linear in this range. Specifically, Lemma 4.9 implies that
h+e′(su(e
′)) = h−e (su(e)) because h
−
e (su(e)) = h
′
u = h
′
w = h
−
e′(sw(e
′)) ≤ h+e′(su(e′)), with the
inequality being true because he′ is concave. Hence, u can move some amount of effort from e to
e′ and still form a best response. Continuing in this manner, we can find another best response
in BRu(Si) for u such that u has contributions that are either more than both its neighbors, or
less than both its neighbors. This implies that there exists u ∈ Si with su ∈ BRu(Si) such that
su(e) ≤ sv(e) for all neighbors v, and therefore our tie-breaking is possible.
Lemma 4.9. Consider two nodes u and v and an edge e = (u, v), and let su ∈ BRu(Si) and
sv ∈ BRv(Si) be the best responses computed in our algorithm. Suppose that sv(e) > su(e).
Then it must be that either h′u > h
′
v, or h
′
u = h
−
e (sv(e)) = h
′
v.
Proof. If edge e is the edge which achieves the minimum value h′u, then we are done, since then
h′u = h
−
e (su(e)) ≥ h−e (sv(e)) ≥ h′v . Therefore, we can assume that another edge e′ = (u,w) with
su(e
′) > 0 achieves this value, so h′u = h
−
e′(su(e
′)).
The fact that we cannot increase u’s reward by assigning more effort to edge e means that
h−e′(su(e
′)) ≥ h+e (su(e)). Since he is concave, we know that h+e (su(e)) ≥ h−e (sv(e)), which is at
least h′v by its definition. This proves that h
′
u ≥ h′v. If this is a strict inequality, then we are
done. The only possible way that h′u = h
′
v is if h
′
u = h
−
e′(su(e
′)) = h−e (sv(e)) = h
′
v, as desired.
First we will prove that our algorithm forms a feasible solution, i.e., that the budget con-
straints are never violated. To do this, we must show that when the i’th node v is woken up and
sets its contribution sv(e) on a newly awake edge e = (u, v), the other sleeping player u must
have enough available budget to match sv(e). In su ∈ BRu(Si) that our algorithm computes,
let Bu be the available budget of node u, that is,
Bu = Bu −
∑
e=(u,w),w∈Ai
sw(e) ,
the budget minus requested contributions on awake edges. This is the maximum amount that
node u could assign to e.
For contradiction, assume that sv(e) > Bu, so our assignment is infeasible. Then it must
be that h−e (su(e)) ≥ h−e (Bu) ≥ h−e (sv(e)), since he is concave. By definition of h′v , we know
that h−e (sv(e)) ≥ h′v, and so h−e (su(e)) ≥ h′v. Now let e′ = (u,w) be the edge that achieves the
value h′u, i.e., h
−
e′(su(e
′)) = h′u. If h
−
e′(su(e
′)) < h′v, then h
−
e′(su(e
′)) < h−e (Bu) ≤ h+e (su(e)), so su
cannot be a best response, since u could earn more reward by switching some amount of effort
from e′ to e. Therefore, we know that h′u ≥ h′v . If this is a strict inequality, then we have a
contradiction, since u would have been woken up before v. Therefore, it must be that h′u = h
′
v .
But this contradicts our tie-breaking rule – we would choose u before v because it puts less
23
effort onto edge e in our choice from BRu(Si) than v does in BRv(Si). Therefore, our algorithm
creates a feasible solution.
Lemma 4.10. For every node u and all Si until node u is woken up, there is a best response in
BRu(Si) that exactly matches the contributions of the awake nodes Ai. In other words, BRu(Si)
is non-empty.
Proof. We prove this by induction on i; this is trivially true for S1. Suppose this is true for Si−1,
and let v be the node that is woken up in the i’th iteration, with an existing edge e = (u, v), so
that Si = Si−1 − {v}. Let su ∈ BRu(Si−1) be u’s best response which exists by the inductive
hypothesis. First, we claim that su(e) ≥ sv(e). To see this, notice that if su(e) < sv(e), then
by Lemma 4.9, we know that h′u ≥ h′v . If this is a strict inequality, then we immediately get a
contradiction, since we picked v to wake up because it had the highest h′v value. If h
′
u = h
′
v, this
contradicts our tie-breaking rule, since u would be woken up first for contributing less to edge
e.
Consider the computation of BRu(Si−1) from u’s point of view. u is deciding how to allocate
its budget Bu among incident edges, in order to maximize its reward. By putting x effort onto
an edge e′ = (u,w) with w ∈ Si−1, u will obtain he′(x) reward, since u can control the strategy
of w, and so will make it match the contribution of u on edge e′. If instead w ∈ Ai−1, then by
putting x effort onto e′, u will only obtain he′(min(x, sw(e
′))) reward, since the strategy of w is
already fixed, and u cannot change it. Then, BRu(Si−1) is simply the set of budget allocations
of u that maximizes the sum of the above reward functions. Now consider the computation
of BRu(Si) and compare it to BRu(Si−1). The only difference is that u cannot control the
node v when computing BRu(Si), i.e., by putting x effort onto edge e, node u will only obtain
he(min(x, sv(e))) reward, instead of he(x).
If su(e) = sv(e), then su ∈ BRu(Si) as well as in BRu(Si−1), since the computations of
BRu(Si) and BRu(Si−1) only differ in the reward function of edge e, and u cannot gain any
utility by putting more than su(e) effort onto edge e in BRu(Si). su matches all the contributions
of nodes in Ai (including v), and so BRu(Si) is non-empty.
Suppose instead that su(e) > sv(e). Now, let s
′
u be a strategy of u created from su as follows.
Remove effort from edge e by setting s′u(e) = sv(e), and add su(e) − sv(e) effort to the other
edges of u in the optimum way to maximize u’s utility in BRu(Si). It is easy to see that this is
a best response in BRu(Si), since a best response in BRu(Si) is simply obtained by repeatedly
adding effort to the edges with highest derivative. Moreover, s′u matches the contributions on
all edges to Ai, so once again we know that BRu(Si) is non-empty.
Re-number the nodes v1, v2, . . . , vn in the order that we wake them. We need to prove that the
algorithm computes a pairwise equilibrium. By Lemma 4.10, we know that all the contributions
in the final solution are symmetric, and that node vi gets exactly the reward BRvi(Si) in the
final solution.
To prove that the above algorithm computes a pairwise equilibrium, we show by induction
on i that node vi will never have incentive to deviate, either unilaterally or bilaterally. This
is clearly true for v1, since it obtains the maximum possible reward that it could have in any
solution, which proves the base case. We now assume that this is true for all nodes earlier than
vi, and prove it for vi as well. It is clear that vi would not deviate unilaterally, since it is getting
the reward of BRvi(Si). This is at least as good as any best response when it cannot control
the strategies of any nodes except itself. By the inductive hypothesis, vi would not deviate
bilaterally with a node vj such that j < i. vi would also not deviate bilaterally with a node vj
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such that j > i, since when forming BRvi(Si) node vi can set the strategy of node vj . So in
BRvi(Si) node vi achieves a reward better than any deviation possible with nodes from Si. This
completes the proof that our algorithm always finds a pairwise equilibrium.
Now we will consider the case when all he are strictly concave, and prove that there is a
unique pairwise equilibrium. Consider the algorithm described above. It is greatly simplified for
this case: since all he are strictly concave, then BRv(Si) consists of only a single strategy, and
by Lemma 4.10, this strategy is also in BRv(Si). We claim that when this algorithm assigns a
strategy sv to a node v, then v must have this strategy in every pairwise equilibrium. We will
prove this by induction, so suppose this is true for all nodes earlier than v = vi, but there is
some pairwise equilibrium s′ where v does not use the strategy sv ∈ BRv(Si). Since s′v 6= sv,
then there must be some edge e = (v, u) such that s′v(e) < sv(e). If u is a node considered
earlier than v, then by the inductive hypothesis, we know that su(e) = s
′
u(e). sv is the unique
best response of v if it were able to control the strategies of nodes in Si. This means that the
gain that v could obtain by moving some small amount of effort to edge e is greater than the
loss that it would obtain from removing effort from any edge to a node of Si, and so v would
have a unilateral deviation in s′. If instead u ∈ Si, then the only way that it would not benefit
v to move some effort onto e is if s′u(e) = s
′
v(e). Since v was chosen by the algorithm before u,
we know that it would always benefit u to move some effort onto edge e in this case, since the
derivative it would encounter there is higher than u encounters on any other edge. Thus, there
exists a bilateral deviation where both u and v move some effort onto edge e.
For the case of strong equilibria, we observe that the arguments for existence can be adapted,
while the upper bounds of 2 on the price of anarchy translate by restriction. In particular,
consider a pairwise equilibrium as described in the proof of Theorem 4.8. Resilience to coalitional
deviations can be established in exactly the same way as above, i.e., the player from the coalition
that was the first to be woken up has no incentive to deviate.
Corollary 4.11. A strong equilibrium always exists in games with fe(x, y) = he(min(x, y))
when all he are continuous, piecewise differentiable, and concave. It is possible to compute
strong equilibria efficiently within any desired precision. Moreover, if all he are strictly concave,
then this equilibrium is unique.
5 Maximum Effort Games
In this section we briefly consider fe(x, y) = he(max(x, y)) for arbitrary monotonic increasing
functions. Our results rely on the following structural observation.
Lemma 5.1. If there is a bilateral deviation that is strictly profitable for both players, then there
is at least one player that has a profitable unilateral deviation.
Proof. Suppose the bilateral deviation decreases the maximum effort on the joint edge. In
this case, both players must receive more profit from other edges. This increase, however, can
obviously also be realized by each player himself.
Suppose the bilateral deviation increases the maximum effort on the joint edge. Then the
player setting the maximum effort on the edge can obviously also do the corresponding strategy
switch by himself, which yields the same outcome for him.
It follows that a stable solution always exists, because the absence of unilateral deviations
implies that the state is also a pairwise equilibrium. Furthermore, the total profit of all players
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is a potential function of the game with respect to unilateral better responses.3 This implies
that the social optimum is a stable state and the price of stability is 1.
Theorem 5.2. A pairwise equilibrium always exists in games with fe(x, y) = he(max(x, y)) and
arbitrary monotonic increasing functions he. The price of stability for pairwise equilibria is 1.
We can also easily derive a tight result on the price of anarchy for arbitrary functions.
Theorem 5.3. The price of anarchy for pairwise equilibria in network contribution games with
fe(x, y) = he(max(x, y)) and arbitrary monotonic increasing functions he is at most 2. This
bound is tight for arbitrary convex functions.
Proof. For an upper bound on the social welfare of the social optimum s∗ consider each player
u and suppose that he optimizes his effort independently. This yields a reward fu. Clearly,
w(s∗) ≤ 2∑u fu. To see this, notice that in s∗, we can assume that every edge has contribution
from only one direction. Let E∗u be the edges to which u contributes in s
∗. In this case, u’s
reward from these edges is at most fu. The reward of the other nodes because of these edges is
also at most fu. Therefore, in total w(s
∗) ≤ 2∑u fu.
On the other hand, in any pairwise equilibrium s player u will not accept less profit than fu,
because by a unilateral deviation he can always achieve (at least) the maxima used to optimize
fu. Thus, wu(s) ≥ fu, and we have that
w(s∗) ≤ 2
∑
u∈V
fu ≤ 2
∑
u∈V
wu(s) = 2w(s) .
Tightness follows from the following simple example. The graph is a path with four nodes
ui, for i = 1, ..., 4. The interior players have budget 1, the leaf players have budget 0. The edges
e1 = (u1, u2) and e2 = (u2, u3) have an arbitrary convex functions h(x), the remaining edge e3
has he3(x) = εh(x), for an arbitrarily small ε > 0. A pairwise equilibrium s evolves when player
u2 spends his effort on e2 and u3 on e3. This yields a total profit of (2 + 2ε)h(1). The optimum
evolves if u2 contributes on e1 and u3 on e2 with total profit of 4h(1).
6 Approximate Equilibrium
We showed above several classes of functions for which pairwise equilibrium exists, and the price
of anarchy is small. If we consider approximate equilibria, however, the following theorem says
that this is always the case. By an α-approximate equilibrium, we will mean a solution where
nodes may gain utility by deviating (either unilaterally or bilaterally), but they will not gain
more than a factor of α utility because of this deviation.
Theorem 6.1. In network contribution games an optimum solution s∗ is a 2-approximate equi-
librium for any class of nonnegative reward functions.
Proof. First, notice that s∗ is always stable against unilateral deviations. This is because when
a node v changes the effort it allocates to its adjacent edges unilaterally, then the only nodes
3Note that the social welfare is not a potential function for bilateral deviations. Consider a path of length 3
with he(x) = 2x on the outer edges and he(x) = 3x on the inner edge. The inner players have budget 1, the outer
players budget 0. If both inner players contribute to the outer edges, their utility is 2. If they both move all their
effort to the inner edge, their utility becomes 3. Note, however, that the social welfare decreases from 8 to 6.
26
affected are neighbors of v. If C is the change in node v’s reward because of its unilateral
deviation, then the total change in social welfare is exactly 2C. Therefore, no node can improve
their reward in s∗ using unilateral deviations.
Now consider bilateral deviations, and assume for contradiction that nodes u and v have a
bilateral deviation by adding some amounts δu and δv to edge e = (u, v), which increases their
rewards by more than a factor of 2. Let z∗u = w
∗
u−fe(s∗u(e), s∗v(e)) and z∗v = w∗v−fe(s∗u(e), s∗v(e))
be the rewards of u and v in s∗ not counting edge e. We denote by zu and zv the same rewards
after u and v deviate by adding effort to e, and therefore possibly taking effort away from other
adjacent edges. In other words, the reward of u before the deviation is w∗u(s
∗) = z∗u+ fe(s
∗
u, s
∗
v),
and after the deviation it is zu+ fe(s
∗
u+ δu, s
∗
v+ δv). Note that this change cannot increase w(s)
over w(s∗), therefore, we know that
2zu + 2zv + 2fe(s
∗
u + δu, s
∗
v + δv) ≤ 2z∗u + 2z∗v + 2fe(s∗u, s∗v) . (8)
On the other hand, since both u and v must improve their reward by more than a factor of 2,
we know that
zu + fe(s
∗
u + δu, s
∗
v + δv) > 2z
∗
u + 2fe(s
∗
u, s
∗
v) ,
and
zv + fe(s
∗
u + δu, s
∗
v + δv) > 2z
∗
v + 2fe(s
∗
u, s
∗
v) .
Adding the last two inequalities together, we obtain that
zu + zv + 2fe(s
∗
u + δu, s
∗
v + δv) > 2z
∗
u + 2z
∗
v + 4fe(s
∗
u, s
∗
v) (9)
≥ 2zu + 2zv + 2fe(s∗u + δu, s∗v + δv) + 2fe(s∗u, s∗v) (10)
which implies that zu + zv + 2fe(s
∗
u, s
∗
v) < 0, a contradiction.
7 Convergence
In this section we consider the convergence of round-based improvement dynamics to pairwise
equilibrium. Perhaps the most prominent variant is best response, in which we deterministically
and sequentially pick one particular player or a pair of adjacent players in each round and allow
them to play a specific unilateral or bilateral deviation. While convergence of such dynamics
is desirable, a drawback is that convergence could rely on the specific deterministic sequence of
deviations. Here we will consider less demanding processes that allow players or pairs of players
to be chosen at random to make deviations, and we even allow concurrent deviations of more
than one player or pair.
We consider random best response, where we randomly pick either a single player or one
pair of adjacent players in each round and allow them to play a unilateral or bilateral deviation.
In each round, we make this choice uniformly at random, i.e, a specific pair (u, v) of players
gets the possibility to make a bilateral deviation with probability 1/(n+m). In concurrent best
response, each player decides independently whether he wants to deviate unilaterally or picks
a neighbor for a bilateral deviation. Obviously, a bilateral deviation can be played if and only
if both players decide to pick each other. Hence, in a given round a player v decides to play a
unilateral deviation with probability pv = 1/(degv + 1), where degv is the degree of v. A pair
(u, v) of players makes a bilateral deviation with probability pu ·pv. Note that in both dynamics,
in expectation, after a polynomial number of rounds each single player or pair of players gets
the chance to play a unilateral or bilateral deviation.
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The name “best response” in our dynamics needs some more explanation for bilateral devia-
tions, because for a pair of players (u, v) a particular joint deviation (s′u, s
′
v) might result in the
best reward for u but not for v. In fact, there might be no joint deviation that is simultaneously
optimal for both players. In this case the players should agree on one of the Pareto-optimal
alternatives.
In this section we consider special kinds of dynamics, which resolve this issue in an intuitive
way. The intuition is that if two players decide to play a bilateral deviation, then these strategies
should also be unilateral best responses. We assume that players do not pick bilateral deviations,
in which they would change the strategies unilaterally. More formally, we capture this intuition
by the following definition.
Definition 7.1. A bilateral best response for a pair (u, v) of players in a state s is a pair
(s′u, s
′
v) of strategies that is
• a profitable bilateral deviation, i.e., wu(s′u, s′v, s−u,v) > wu(s), and wv(s′u, s′v, s−u,v) >
wv(s), and
• a pair of mutual best responses, i.e., wu(s′u, s′v, s−u,v) ≥ wu(s′′u, s′v, s−u,v) for every strategy
s′′u of player u, and similarly for v.
Note that, in principle, there might be states that allow a bilateral deviation, but there exists
no bilateral best response. The set of states resilient to unilateral and bilateral best responses
is a superset of pairwise equilibria. Hence, it might not even be obvious that dynamics using
only bilateral best responses converge to pairwise equilibria. Our results below, however, show
that the latter is true in many of the games for which we showed existence of pairwise equilibria
above.
General Convex Functions For games with strictly coordinate-convex functions, the con-
cept of bilateral best response reduces to a simple choice rule. In this case, a unilateral best
response of every player places the entire player budget on a single edge. This implies that there
is no bilateral best response where players split their efforts. Thus, bilateral best responses come
in three different forms, in which the players allocate their efforts towards their joint edge (1)
both, (2) only one of them, or (3) none of them.
Consider two incident players u and v in state s connected by edge e. To compute a bilateral
best response from one of the forms mentioned above, we proceed in two phases. In the first
phase, we try forms (2) and (3) and remove all contributions from e. Then player u independently
picks a unilateral best response under the assumption that sv(e) = 0. Note that in case of equal
reward a player always prefers to put the effort on e, because this might attract the other player
to put effort on e as well and, by convexity, increase their own reward even further. Similarly,
we do this for player v. This yields a pair of “virtual” best responses under the condition that
the other player does not contribute to e. Now we have to check whether this is a bilateral best
response. In particular, if only one of the players puts effort on e, by convexity it might become
a unilateral best response for the other player to put his effort on e as well. If this is the case,
the computed state is not a pair of mutual best responses, thus the most profitable candidate
for a bilateral best response is of form (1).
If this is not the case, then by convexity one player is not willing to contribute to e at
all. Hence, his virtual best response is a unilateral best response even though the other player
contributes to e. For the other player, this means that the assumption made for the virtual
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best response are satisfied, hence, we have found a set of mutual best responses of the form
(2) or (3). However, in this case, this set might not be a bilateral best response because the
players do not improve over their current reward. We thus also check, whether a state of form
(1) is a better set of mutual best responses. Hence, we consider the state of form (1) and the
resulting reward for each player. Each reward must be at least as large as that from the virtual
best responses, because otherwise the state does not represent a set of mutual best responses.
If this is the case, we accept s′u(e) = Bu and s
′
v(e) = Bv as our candidate for the bilateral best
response. Otherwise, we use the pair of virtual best responses.
Note that our algorithm computes in each case the most profitable candidate for a bilateral
best response, and always finds a bilateral best response if one exists. This can be verified
directly for each of the cases, in which there is a bilateral best response of forms (1), (2), or (3).
Theorem 7.2. Random and concurrent best response dynamics converge to a pairwise equilib-
rium in a polynomial number of rounds when all reward functions are strictly coordinate-convex
and fe(0, x) = 0 for all e ∈ E and x ≥ 0.
Proof. Let us consider the edges in classes of their cu,v (c.f. proof of Theorem 2.5). In particular,
our analysis proceeds in phases. In phase 1, we restrict our attention to the first class of edges
with the highest cu,v and the subgraph induced by these edges. Consider one such edge e and
suppose both players contribute their complete budgets to e. They are never again willing
to participate in a bilateral deviation (not only a bilateral best response), because by strict
convexity they achieve the maximum possible revenue. We will call such players stabilized.
Consider a first class edge e = (u, v) where strategies su(e) < Bu and sv(e) = Bv. In this case,
strict convexity, fe(x, y) = 0 when xy = 0, and maximality of cu,v imply that s
′
u(e) = Bu is a
unilateral best response - independently of the current su. If both players have su(e) < Bu and
sv(e) < Bv, then the same argument implies that both players allocating their full budget is a
bilateral best response, again independently of what the current strategies of the players are.
Note that each bilateral best response of two destabilized players enlarges the set of stabilized
players. Phase 1 ends when there are no adjacent destabilized players with respect to first class
edges, and this obviously takes only an expected number of time steps that is polynomial in n.
After phase 1 has ended, we know that the stabilized players are never going to change their
strategy again. Hence, for the purpose of our analysis, we drop the edges between stabilized
players from consideration. The same can be done for all edges e incident to exactly one stabilized
player v, by artificially reducing v’s budget to Bv = 0 and noting that fe(Bu, 0) = 0. If there are
remaining destabilized players, phase 2 begins, and we consider only the remaining players and
the edges among them. In this graph, we again consider only the subgraph induced by edges
with highest cu,v. Again, we have the property that any pair of players contributing their full
budget to such an edge is stabilized. Additionally, the same arguments show that for destabilized
players there are always unilateral and/or bilateral best responses that result in investing the
full budget, irrespective of the current strategy. Hence, after expected time polynomial in n,
phase 2 ends and expands the set of stabilized players by at least 2.
Repeated application of this argument shows that after expected time polynomial in n either
all players are stabilized or the remaining subgraph of destabilized players is empty. In this case,
a pairwise equilibrium is reached. In particular, using unilateral and bilateral best responses
suffices to stabilize all but an independent set of players. It is easy to observe that stabilized
players have no profitable unilateral or bilateral deviations. Possibly remaining destabilized
players in the end are only adjacent to stabilized players and therefore have no profitable unilat-
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u1 v1 w1 z1
u2 v2 w2 z2
vc
2x2 5x 6x 1000x
1000x6x5x2x2
Figure 2: A minimum effort game with convex reward functions and uniform budgets Bv = 2.
There is a starting state such that no sequence of bilateral best responses can reach a stable
state.
eral or bilateral deviations. Thus, our dynamics converge to a pairwise equilibrium in expected
polynomial time. This proves the theorem.
Minimum Effort Games and Convex Functions In this section we show that there are
games with infinite convergence time of random and concurrent best response dynamics, al-
though in each step bilateral best responses are unique and can be found easily.
Theorem 7.3. There are minimum effort games that have convex functions, uniform budgets,
and starting states, from which any dynamics using only bilateral best responses does not converge
to a stable state.
Proof. We consider two paths of length 4 as in the games of Example 4.4 and introduce a new
player vc as shown in Figure 2. All players have budget 2. In our starting state s we assign
all incident players to contribute 1 to the edges (z1, vc) and (z2, vc). This yields a maximum
revenue of 2000 for vc. As long as this remains the case, vc will never participate in a bilateral
deviation. In turn, in every unilateral best response players z1 and z2 will match the contribution
of vc towards their joint edges. Note that this essentially creates the budget restriction for the
z-players that is necessary to show non-existence of a pairwise equilibrium in Example 4.4.
It remains to show that we can implement the cycling of dynamics in terms of bilateral best
responses. For this, note that for player u1 it is always a unilateral best response to match any
contribution of v1 on their joint edge (similarly for u2 and v2). The same is true for z1, he will
match the contribution of w1 up to an effort of 1. Finally, the joint deviations of players v1 and
w1 are bilateral best responses as well. This implies that the cycling dynamics outlined above in
Example 4.4 remain present when we restrict to bilateral best responses. Thus, no stable state
can be reached.
Observe that in this game there are sequences of bilateral deviations that converge to a
pairwise equilibrium, but the bilateral deviations are not bilateral best responses. Consider an
arbitrary cycling sequence of bilateral deviations from our starting state, and w.l.o.g. consider
the cycling dynamics happen on the upper path in Figure 2. Then at some point we will see a
bilateral deviation of w2 and z2, in which on their joint edge z2 contributes 1 and w2 increases
his effort. This creates a strict improvement of utility for both of them. Note that a bilateral
deviation allows both w2 and z2 to change their strategies in arbitrary manner. Thus, while
increasing his contribution towards w2, z2 can also simultaneously decrease his contribution
towards vc. If the decrease is very tiny, the increase in reward on the edge to w2 outweighs
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the decrease of reward on the edge to vc. In this way, this deviation still generates a strict
improvement of utility for z2. Hence, both z2 and w2 would make strict improvement although
z2 decreases the contribution towards vc by a tiny amount, hence this represents a profitable
bilateral deviation (but obviously not a best response). Afterwards, the balance for vc is broken,
and vc and z1 have a bilateral deviation to put all effort on their joint edge. This quickly leads
to a pairwise equilibrium. Naturally, the argument works symmetrically for z1. However, such
an evolution is quite unreasonable, as it is always in the interest of the z-players to keep their
contribution towards vc as high as possible.
Minimum Effort Games and Concave Functions For concave functions, we can use the
following simple rule to find a bilateral best response. Consider two incident players u and v
in state s connected by edge e. In the first phase we consider each player independently and
compute a unilateral best response s′u and s
′
v under the assumption that the other player would
match his contribution on e. Then we fix the strategy of the player u for which s′u(e) < s
′
v(e).
In the state s′, player u is perfectly happy with his choice and would not participate in any
bilateral deviation. However, player v might be willing to deviate, so we recalculate a unilateral
best response for v under the condition that s′v(e) ≤ s′u(e). Note that, due to concavity of the
functions, v has a unilateral best response that matches s′u(e). This yields a pair of mutual best
responses: u has best possible utility (even if it were able to control v’s strategy), and v has the
best possible utility given u’s strategy. As usual, the players switch to (s′u, s
′
v) if and only if it
is a profitable bilateral deviation.
Theorem 7.4. Random and concurrent best response dynamics converge to a pairwise equi-
librium when all reward functions are fe(x, y) = he(min(x, y)) with differentiable and strictly
concave he.
Proof. We measure progress in terms of the derivatives of the edges. For a state s consider
an edge with highest derivative emax = argmaxe∈E h
′
e, where h
′
(u,v) = h
′
e(min(su(e), sv(e))).
Obviously, h′max = h
′
emax ≥ h′e for any other edge e ∈ E, so in any unilateral or bilateral best
response the incident players will not try to remove effort from this edge once su(e) = sv(e). Edge
emax = (u, v) is stabilized if there is a player u with h
′
max = h
′
e′ for every edge e
′ = (u, v′) ∈ E
and spending all his budget, i.e.,
∑
e′=(u,v′)∈E se′(u) = Bu. In this case, no player will remove
effort from emax, but at least one player has no interest in increasing effort on emax.
We now consider the dynamics starting in a state s and the set of non-stabilized edges Emax
with maximum derivative h′max among non-stabilized edges. Suppose that a bilateral deviation
results in a reduction of the minimum effort on any edge e to a value x with h′e(x) > h
′
max.
This is a contradiction to h′max being the currently highest derivative value and the deviation
being composed of mutual unilateral best responses. Hence, the value h′max will never increase
over the run of the dynamics. As an edge e ∈ Emax with highest derivative is not stabilized,
both incident players have other incident edges with strictly smaller derivative. Hence, if they
play a bilateral best response, they strictly increase effort on e while strictly decreasing effort
on other edges. By strict concavity this implies that after the step h′e < h
′
max. In addition,
both players picking a best response means that the derivative of all edges that were previously
lower than h′max now remain at most h
′
e. This means that no new edge with derivative value
h′max is created, but e is removed. Thus, in each such step we either increase the number of
stabilized edges, or we decrease the number of edges of highest derivative among non-stabilized
edges. As such a step is played after a finite number of steps in expectation, this argument
proves convergence.
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It remains to show that the resulting state, in which all edges are stabilized, is resilient to all
unilateral and bilateral deviations and not only against the type of bilateral best responses we
used to converge to it. Here we can apply an inductive argument similar to Theorem 4.8 that
no profitable bilateral deviation exists and the state is indeed a pairwise equilibrium. Note that
the argument simplifies quite drastically for the case of strictly concave functions. In particular,
we consider the edge with maximum derivative. For at least one incident player v, all edges
with positive minimum effort have the same derivative, hence this player will never change his
strategy. In addition, the other adjacent players have an incentive to keep their efforts on the
edges with v. Thus, we can remove v, reduce the budgets of incident players and iterate. This
proves the theorem.
The previous proof shows that convergence is achieved in the limit, but the decrease of
the maximum derivative value is not bounded. If the state is close to a pairwise equilibrium,
the changes could become arbitrarily small, and the convergence time until reaching the exact
equilibrium could well be infinite.
8 General Contribution Games
In this section we generalize some of our results to general contribution games. However, a
detailed study of such general games remains as an open problem. A general contribution game
can be represented by a hypergraph G = (V,E). The set of nodes V is the set of players, and
each edge e ∈ E is a hyperedge e ⊆ 2V and represents a joint project of a subset of players.
Reward functions and player utilities are defined as before. In particular, using the notation
se = (su)u∈e we get reward functions fe(se) with fe : (R≥0)
|e| → R≥0. In this case, we extend
our stability concept to setwise equilibrium that is resilient against all deviations of all player
sets that are a subset of any hyperedge. In a setwise equilibrium no (sub-)set of players incident
to the same hyperedge has an improving move, i.e., a combination of strategies for the players
such that every player of the subset strictly improves. More formally, a setwise equilibrium s is
a state such that for every edge e ∈ E and every player subset U ⊆ e we have that for every
possible deviation s′U = (s
′
u)u∈U there is at least one player v ∈ U that does not strictly improve
wv(s) ≥ wv(s′U , s−U ), where s−U = (su)u∈V−U . Note that this definition includes all unilateral
deviations as a special case. The most central parameter in this context will be the size of the
largest project k = maxe∈E |e|.
We note in passing that Nash equilibria without resilience to multilateral improving moves are
again always guaranteed for all reward functions. It is easy to observe that Φ(s) =
∑
e∈E fe(se) is
an exact potential function for the game. Note that this is equal to k ·w(s) and thus equivalent
to w(s) only for uniform hypergraphs, in which all hyperedges have the same cardinality k.
In these cases the price of stability for Nash equilibria is always 1. Otherwise, it is easy to
construct simple examples, in which all Nash equilibria (and therefore all setwise equilibria)
must be suboptimal.4
Convex Functions For general convex functions we extend the functions of class C to multi-
ple dimensions. In particular, the functions are coordinate-convex and have non-negative mixed
4Consider a maximum effort game with players u, v1, v2, and v3 and edges e = {u, v1} and g = {u, v1, v2}.
Budgets Bu = 1 and Bvi = 0 for i = 1, 2, 3. Rewards are given by a convex function h(x) for edge g and a function
(1 + ε)h(x) for e. Note that in any Nash equilibrium su(e) = 1. For small ε < 1/2 this gives w(s) = (2 + 2ε)h(1),
whereas we have higher welfare w(s) = 3h(1) when su(g) = 1.
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partial second derivatives for any pair of dimensions. We first observe that the proof of The-
orem 2.5 can be adjusted easily to general games if functions fe are coordinate-convex and
fe(se) = 0 whenever su(e) = 0 for at least one u ∈ e.
Corollary 8.1. A setwise equilibrium always exists and can be computed efficiently when all
reward functions fe are coordinate-convex and fe(se) = 0 whenever su(e) = 0 for at least one
u ∈ e.
Note that we can also adjust the proof of Claim 2.10 for optimum solutions in a straightfor-
ward way. In particular, to obtain the social welfare for projects e, e1 and e2 we simply multiply
each occurrence of the functions f , f1 and f2 in the formulas by the corresponding cardinali-
ties of their edges. This does not change the reasoning and proves an analogous statement of
Claim 2.10 also for general games. The actual proof of Theorem 2.9 then is a simple accounting
argument that relies on the cardinality of the projects. The observation that the difference be-
tween
∑
ewe(s
∗) and w(s∗) is bounded by k yields the following corollary. As previously, these
results directly extend to strong equilibria, as well.
Corollary 8.2. For the class of general contribution games with reward functions in class C for
all e ∈ E that have a setwise equilibrium, the price of anarchy for setwise equilibria is at most
k.
Minimum Effort Games For minimum effort games some of our arguments translate directly
to the treatment of general games. For existence with convex functions and uniform budgets,
we can apply the same “greedy matching” argument and wake up players until every hyperedge
is incident to at least one awake player. The argument that this creates a setwise equilibrium is
almost identical to the one given in Theorem 4.2 for pairwise equilibria. This yields the following
corollary.
Corollary 8.3. A setwise equilibrium always exists in games with uniform budgets and fe(se) =
he(minu∈e su(e)) when all he are convex. If all he are strictly convex, all setwise equilibria are
integral.
The duality analysis for the price of anarchy in Theorem 4.3 can be carried out as well. In
this case, however, the crucial inequality reads s∗e ·
∑
u∈e yu ≥ s∗efe(1) ≥ fe(s∗e). This results in
a price of anarchy of k.
Corollary 8.4. The price of anarchy for setwise equilibria in general contribution games is at
most k when all reward functions fe(se) = he(minu∈e su(e)) with convex he, and budgets are
uniform.
Again, both corollaries extend also to strong equilibria.
Maximum Effort Games For maximum effort games it is not possible to extend the main
insight in Lemma 5.1 to general games. There are general maximum effort games without setwise
equilibria. This holds even for pairwise equilibria in network contribution games, in which the
graph G is not simple, i.e., if we allow multiple edges between agents.
Example 8.5. We consider a simple game that in essence implements a Prisoner’s Dilemma.
There is a path of four players u, v, w and z, with edges e1 = (u, v), e2 = (v,w) and e3 = (w, z).
33
In addition, there is a second edge e4 = (v,w) between v and w. The budgets are Bu = Bz = 0
and Bv = Bw = 1. The reward functions are he1(x) = he3(x) = 3x, he2(x) = he4(x) = 2x.
Note that for v and w it is a unilateral dominant strategy to put all effort on edges e1 and e3,
respectively. However, in that case v and w can jointly increase their reward by allocating all
effort to e2 and e4, respectively.
For general maximum effort games characterizing the existence and computational complex-
ity of pairwise, setwise, and strong equilibria is an interesting open problem.
9 Conclusions and Open Problems
In this paper we have proposed and studied a simple model of contribution games, in which
agents can invest a fixed budget into different relationships. Our results show that collaboration
between pairs of players can lead to instabilities and non-existence of pairwise equilibria. For
certain classes of functions, the existence of pairwise equilibria is even NP-hard to decide. This
implies that it is impossible to decide efficiently if a set of players in a game can reach a pairwise
equilibrium. For many interesting classes of games, however, we are able to show existence and
bound the price of anarchy to 2. This includes, for instance, a class of games with general convex
functions, or minimum effort games with concave functions. Here we are also able to show that
best response dynamics converge to pairwise equilibria.
There is a large variety of open problems that stem from our work. The obvious open problem
is to adjust our results for the network case to general set systems and general contribution
games. While some of our proofs can be extended in a straightforward way, many open problems,
most prominently for concave functions, remain.
Another obvious direction is to identify other relevant classes of games within our model
and prove existence and tight bounds on the price of anarchy. Another interesting aspect is, for
instance, the effect of capacity constraints, i.e., restrictions on the effort that a player can invest
into a particular project.
More generally, instead of a total budget a player might have a function that characterizes
how much he has to “pay” for the total effort that he invests in all projects. Such “price”
functions are often assumed to be linear or convex (e.g., in [14,39]).
Finally, an intriguing adjustment that we outlined in the introduction is to view the projects
as instances of the combinatorial agency framework and to examine equilibria in this more
extended model.
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